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Abstract
We develop a series of small infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference in-
volving intra/inter-personal beliefs/knowledge such as common knowledge, common beliefs,
and infinite regress of beliefs. Specifically, propositional epistemic logics GL(Lα) are pre-
sented for ordinal α up to a given αo (αo ≥ ω) so that GL(L0) is finitary KDn with n agents
and GL(Lα) (α ≥ 1) allows conjunctions of certain countably infinite formulae. GL(Lα) is
small in that the language is countable and can be constructive. The set of formulae Lα is
increasing up to α = ω but stops at ω.We present Kripke-completeness for GL(Lα) for each
α ≤ ω, which is proved using the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma and Tanaka-Ono lemma. GL(Lα)
has a sufficient expressive power to discuss intra/inter-personal beliefs with infinite lengths.
As applications, we discuss the explicit definability of Axioms T (truthfulness), 4 (positive
introspection), 5 (negative introspection), and of common knowledge in GL(Lα). Also, we
discuss the rationalizability concept in game theory in our framework. We evaluate where
these discussions are done in the series GL(Lα), α ≤ ω.
1 Introduction
We develop a series of infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving in-
tra/inter-personal beliefs/knowledge in social situations. In these situations, people’s beliefs
may include infinitary components such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite
regress of beliefs. To approach such situations, we extend the finitary epistemic logic KDn with
n agents to infinitary logics, illustrated as
KDn = GL(L0)⇒ GL(L1)⇒ · · ·⇒ GL(Lω). (1)
Each logic GL(Lα) is “small” in that the set of formulae is countable and can be constructive.
These logics are formulated in a Hilbert-style, and each is complete with respect to Kripke
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semantics. This implies that the logics in (1) are connected by the conservative extension relation
⇒, and the series can be used in various manners to evaluate infinitary concepts. Our approach
offers a new framework, alternative to the existing literatures on related issues on infinitary
epistemic concepts, with applications to evaluations of epistemic axioms and of decision-making
processes in game theory.
First, we compare our approach with two literatures on infinitary epistemic concepts: the
infinitary logic literature since Karp [19] (for epistemic logics, Kaneko-Nagashima [20], Tanaka-
Ono [33], Tanaka [32], Heifetz [12]), and the fixed-point logic literature (for epistemic logics,
Fagin et al. [8], Meyer-van der Hoek [25], and for µ-calculus, Enqvist, et al. [7], Jäger, et al.
[16], and Jäger-Studer [17]). Both approaches have some merits and demerits; to discuss such
merits and demerits, we note that the infinitary epistemic concepts we consider in applications
are typically constructed by iterated substitution of the belief operators.
The infinitary logic approach is capable of discussing various infinitary concepts in an explicit
and unified manner. However, the languages are very large (at least continuum) in terms of sets
of formulae. A large language is not only unnecessary but also sometimes imposes an obstacle
for a precise study of targeted infinitary concepts. The fixed-point logic approach has a merit
to be specific to targeted infinitary concepts, but has the inconvenience that targeted concepts
are indirectly expressed by a fixed-point argument. In contrast to these approaches, ours allows
for explicit and unified treatments of targeted concepts and enables us to evaluate, as in (1),
how large a given targeted concept requires. The key to our approach is a syntactical concept
of germinal forms, upon which we build a series of languages, as explained below.
Our base logic is a finitary KDn with language L0 (the set of formula); the agents have
classical logical abilities and contradiction-free beliefs, described by the belief operators Bi(·)
for agents 1, ..., n. We extend the finitary language L0 by adding conjunctions of certain infinite
sequences of formulae in L0. Specifically, we take a countable number of infinite sequences
〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉 = 〈C0(p), C1(p), ...〉 from L0, which we call germinal forms. A typical example
is common knowledge. The germinal form for it is given as 〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉 = 〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉;
C0(p) = p, C1(p) = ∧i∈NBi(p), ..., Cν+1(p) = ∧i∈NBiCν(p), ... (2)
The conjunction BωN (p) := ∧〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 is the common knowledge of p, meaning that p
holds, all agents believe p, all agents believe all believe p, and so on. This is not in L0, and we
extend L0 to L1 to have BωN (A) as a targeted formula.
The next layer L2 is obtained from L1 by adding the infinite conjunctions ∧〈Cν(A) : ν ≥
0〉 for A ∈ L1, e.g., BωN (BωN (A)); roughly speaking, each formula in L2 includes infinitary
conjunctions nested at most twice. Assuming that the set of germinal forms are unchanged, we
define L0,L1, ...,Lα, ... up to some ordinal αo ≥ ω := {0, 1, ...}. We show that this extension
stops at Lω = ∪α<ωLα = Lω+1 = ... = Lαo . The language Lα is kept countable for all α ≤ ω.
Also, we show that the ordinal depth of each formula in Lω is less than ω2.
Infinitary concepts such as common knowledge are typically constructed by iteration of
substitutions. Our formulation of a germinal form is rich enough to capture these infinitary
concepts. In our approach, however, germinal forms are more generally defined even to allow
nonconstructive sequences 〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉. This implies that our theory is quite flexible and
could go beyond our current applications.
The proof systems in the series (1) are uniform; they share the same logical axiom schemata
2
and inference rules only with the restriction to each Lα.1 The Kripke semantics is defined also
in a uniform manner over α. Each GL(Lα) is proved to be sound and complete with respect
to Kripke semantics. It follows from this result that GL(Lα+1) is a conservative extension of
GL(Lα), i.e., for any formula A ∈ Lα, A is provable in GL(Lα) if and only if it is provable in
GL(Lα+1). In (1), the double arrow ⇒ describes the conservative extension relation.
To prove Kripke-completeness, we adopt the Q-filter method developed in Tanaka-Ono [33].
Q-filters play the corresponding role to that of maximal consistent sets of formulae in the stan-
dard construction of a canonical model. The Q-filter method is crucial, since GL(Lα) deals
with both particular infinitary conjunctions and modality. To treat these aspects, our proof
relies upon two lemmas, the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma and Tanaka-Ono lemma; the countabil-
ity of the language Lα is crucial in applications of these lemmas. Although we use various
algebraic concepts, our model theory is Kripke semantics, but not algebraic semantics. Our
completeness theorem can be modified to systems including additional epistemic axioms, Ax-
ioms T (truthfulness – Bi(A) ⊃ A), 4 (positive introspection – Bi(A) ⊃ BiBi(A)), and/or 5
(negative introspection – ¬Bi(A) ⊃ Bi(¬Bi(A))).
We deliberately choose the base logic KDn = GL(L0). In the literature of epistemic logic,
all, some, or none of Axioms T, 4, and 5 for Bi(·) are adopted depending upon purposes/en-
vironments. Axioms 4 and 5 include infinitary aspects, though they are expressed in a finitary
way. In our approach, we can study these axioms in terms of explicit definability in GL(Lα)
in the series in (1), that is, we ask whether there is a formula in GL(Lα) such that it is an
extension of Bi(·) and satisfies each of T, 4, and 5. For T, it is affirmatively answered in all
α, for 4, we need α = ω, and for 5, the answer is entirely negative. Also, we consider faithful
embedding of the logics added T and/or 4 in GL(Lα). Axiom D is included as a basic axiom in
our framework, since it is crucial in proving (20) for playability in Section 5.
We also consider the faithful embedding of the common knowledge logic, denoted CK(LC),
which is the fixed-point extension of KDn, to GL(Lα). As a whole, CK(LC) is faithfully embed-
ded into GL(Lω). Logic CK(LC) is also a fragment of modal µ-calculus (Alberucci [1]). In this
context, we show that a comparison between the rank function given in Alberucci, et al. [2] and
our ordinal depth for Lω coincide.
Although CK(LC) can be regarded as being in the intersection of our approach and modal
µ-calculus, these two approaches differ from each other not only in that the former is infinitary
while the latter is finitary, but also in that the differences are substantive. We make a small
summary of comparisons between our approach and modal µ-calculus in the end of Section 4.3.
Using our framework, we study a decision making process in game theory, called “ratio-
nalizability” (cf., Osborne-Rubinstein [27]). In this theory, an agent “rationalizes” his possible
decision by looking for a prediction about his opponent’s decision, assuming that the opponent
uses the same criterion. This leads to an infinite regress of such rationalization. We show that
the full discourse from a consideration of decision-making to the stage of playing a final decision
can be given in logic GL(L2). Thus, our framework allows for explication of game theoretic
decision making with a clear-cut notion of depths of infinitary reasoning.
The paper format is as follows: Section 2 gives the definition of the sets of formulae. Section 3
formulates the system GL(Lα) and the Kripke semantics, and states the completeness result.
In Sections 4 and 5, we give discussions on applications of our framework and the completeness
1Below KDn, a hierarchy of logics of shallow epistemic depths is developed in Kaneko-Suzuki [22]. Each system
is a fragment of KDn with a finite epistemic structure, and continues to KDn.
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result to the definability problems of various epistemic concepts, and also on an application to
the rationalizability concept in game theory. A proof of Kripke-completeness is given in Section
6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Small Infinitary Languages Lα
We fix an ordinal αo with αo ≥ ω = {0, 1, ...}. We define the class of infinitary languages
{Lα : α ≤ αo}. For each α, Lα is constructed from ∪β<αLβ in an inductive manner, and we will
show that Lα becomes constant after α = ω. We also evaluate the depths of formulae in Lα,
and show that the depth of the entire set Lω is ω2. In the end of this section, we make brief
comparisons with the set of formulae in the literatures of infinitary logics. We stipulate that
Greek letters α, β, γ are ordinals up to αo, but Greek ν runs over the natural numbers 0, 1, ...
We adopt the following list of primitive symbols:
propositional variables: p0,p1, ...; logical connectives: ¬ (not), ⊃ (implies), ∧ (and);
unary belief operators: B1(·), ..., Bn(·) (1 ≤ n < ω); parentheses: ( , ); brackets: 〈 , 〉.
The conjunction symbol ∧ is applied to a finite set of formulae and some infinite sequences of
formulae. An infinitary conjunction is written as ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 and will be specified below.
We denote P0 = {p0,p1, ...}, and the set of agents (the subscripts for the beliefs operators) by
N = {1, ..., n}. We may abbreviate the parentheses (, ) and use different brackets when they
cause no confusions.
Let α be an ordinal with α ≤ αo. Let Fα be a given set of formulae with F0 = ∅, which is
the source of infinitary conjunctions and is specified below. We define the set Lα for α ≥ 0 by a
double induction. Specifically, when α = 0, P0 = {p0,p1, ...}, and when α > 0, Pα = ∪β<αLβ,
provided that the set of formulae Lβ is already defined for all β < α. We define the set Lα for
each α ≥ 0 by the following three steps:
Iα0: all formulae in Pα ∪ Fα belong to Lα;
Iα1 (finitary extension): if A,B are formulae in Lα, so are (A ⊃ B), (¬A), Bi(A) (i ∈ N);
and if Φ is a nonempty finite set of formulae in Lα, then (∧Φ) is a formula in Lα;
Iα2 (infinitary extension): if ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉,∧〈Dν : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ Lα and A ∈ Lα, then
(i) ∧〈A ⊃ Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ Lα;
(ii) ∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ Lα for all i ∈ N ;
(iii) ∧ 〈∧{Cν , Dν} : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ Lα.
When α = 0, step Iα2 is vacuous since F0 = ∅; thus, L0 is the set of all finitary formulae.
In Iα1, the conjunction symbol ∧ is applied to finite sets of formulae. We write A∧B,A∧B∧C
for ∧{A,B} and ∧{A,B,C}, etc., and A ≡ B for (A ⊃ B)∧(B ⊃ A). Iα1 and Iα2 are interactive
since formulae generated by Iα2 may be used in Iα1, and vice versa.
The set Fα is determined by a given set of germinal forms specified as follows. A sequence
〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 is called a germinal form iff Cν ∈ L0 for all ν ≥ 0 and a finite number of
propositional variables occur in 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. Let p1, ..., pm be the propositional variables
occurring in 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. We often denote each Cν in 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 by Cν(p1, ..., pm), though
some of them may not be included in Cν . Let A1, ..., Am be formulae in Pα = ∪β<αLβ, which are
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called germs. By substituting At for each occurrence of pt in 〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) : ν ≥ 0〉, we obtain
the sequence 〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) : ν ≥ 0〉. We say that Φ = 〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) : ν ≥ 0〉 is generated
by a germinal form 〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) : ν ≥ 0〉 and germs A1, ..., Am in Pα. This generation is
illustrated as follows:
〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) : ν ≥ 0〉 −→ Φ = 〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) : ν ≥ 0〉
substituting At for pt
(3)
For example, 〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉 = 〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 is the germinal form for common knowledge.
We remark that germinal forms do not require (p1, ..., pm) to enter Cν(p1, ..., pm) positively, e.g.,
〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉 = 〈¬p,¬¬p, ...〉 is a germinal form, and a less trivial one will be given later.
Let G be a nonempty countable (possibly finite) set of germinal forms. We define:
Fα = {∧Φ : Φ is generated some germinal form in G and germs in Pα}. (4)
Since G is at most countable and used uniformly for all α ≤ α0, we can see that the sets Fα and
Lα remain countable for each α ≤ αo.
In addition, Iα0 to Iα2 generate the other infinite conjunctions. We call ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ Lα
an α-infinite conjunction, and 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 an α-permissible sequence. Sometimes, we simply call
∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 an infinite conduction. We stipulate that A ∈ 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 iff A ∈ {Cν : ν ≥ 0}.
We use the same expression, ∧Φ, for a finite conjunction or an infinite conjunction. We write
Bi(Φ) for 〈Bi(C) : C ∈ Φ〉 if Φ is an α-permissible sequence or {Bi(C) : C ∈ Φ} if Φ is a finite
set of formulae in Lα.
A series of languages {Lα : α ≤ αo} is determined by a given set of germinal forms G; we
may write Lα = Lα(G) to emphasize the choice of G for Lα. Each Lα serves a language for an
epistemic logic GL(Lα) to be given in Section 3. Thus, {Lα : α ≤ αo} = {Lα(G) : α ≤ αo}
is not only a series of languages but also determines a series of epistemic logics. When G is
changing with fixed α, we have another series of languages and logics. Using these series, we
discuss the required depth α and germinal forms G for a discourse involving infinitary concepts.
In Section 1, we gave the germinal form 〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉 = 〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 for common
knowledge, which is defined by (2).2 As emphasized in Section 1, this is generated by iterations
of substitutions. Here, we give a few more examples; the last one is not based on iterations of
substitutions.
Example 2.1 (1) Positive introspection: Let i ∈ N be fixed. We define
B0i (p) = Bi(p) and B
ν+1
i (p) = Bi(B
ν
i (p)) for ν ≥ 0. (5)
The sequence 〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 is a possible germinal form. Then, we denote Bωi (p) := ∧〈Bνi (p) :
ν ≥ 0〉. For A ∈ Pα, Bωi (A) belongs to Fα as long as 〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ G. We will see in Section
4 that the formula Bωi (A) is regarded as the infinitary extension of finitary Bi(A) in that B
ω
i (A)
enjoys the positive introspection property (Axiom 4) in GL(Lω).
For both common knowledge and positive introspection, the germinal forms are obtained by
substituting for one propositional variable. The next example needs two propositional variables.
Game theoretical examples may involve more propositional variables; one example is given in
Section 5.
2The common belief of A is defined by plugging germ ∧i∈NBi(A) to p in 〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉, that is,
BωN (∧i∈NBi(A)).
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(2) Infinite regress: Let n = 2. We prepare two formulae Bi(pj) and Bj(pi) with {i, j} =
{1, 2}. Then, the germinal forms 〈Irνi [p1, p2] : ν ≥ 0〉 , i = 1, 2, are generated as follows: for
i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j),
Ir0i [p1, p2] = Bi(pi); and Ir
ν+1
i [p1, p2] = Bi(Ir
ν
j [p1, p2]) for ν ≥ 0. (6)
We write the conjunction Iri[p1, p2] := ∧〈Irνi [p1, p2] : ν ≥ 0〉 for i = 1, 2. Let A1, A2 ∈ Pα. The
epistemic infinite regress for agent i from Ai and Aj is given Iri[A1, A2] = ∧〈Bi(Ai),BiBj(Aj),
BiBjBi(Ai), ...〉.
Epistemic infinite regress is a subjective concept in that each formula for i occurs in the scope
of Bi(·), and is an extension of common belief. When A1 = A2 = A, Ir1[A1, A2] ∧ Ir2[A1, A2] is
equivalent to the common belief of A. The epistemic infinitary regress takes subjectivity (and
individuality) more seriously than common knowledge and common belief.
(3) More general germinal forms: We do not assume positivity for germinal forms. The
example already given is 〈¬p,¬¬p, ...〉, which is generated by iterated substitutions with ¬p.
This is inconsistent, but still allowed in our theory. A consistent example is the germinal forms
〈B1(p1),¬B1B2(p2),¬B1¬B2B1(p1),¬B1¬B2¬B1B2(p2), ...〉; (7)
〈B2(p2),¬B2B1(p1),¬B2¬B1B2(p2),¬B2¬B1¬B2B1(p1), ...〉,
each of which is obtained by Cν1 (p1, p2) = ¬B1Cν−12 (p1, p2) and Cν2 (p1, p2) = ¬B2Cν−12 (p1, p2)
for each ν ≥ 1 with C01 (p1, p2) = B1(p1) and C02 (p1, p2) = B2(p2). Their conjunctions are
consistent in our logic containing them in the language.
The above examples are constructed by iteration of substitutions. However, our formulation
also allows for infinite conjunctions that cannot be obtained by iterated substitutions. For exam-
ple, let {kν : ν ≥ 0} be the sequence of Fibonacci numbers and define Cν(p) = Bk01 Bk12 ...Bkνi (p),
where i = 1 if ν is even and i = 2 otherwise. This sequence 〈Cν(p) : ν ≥ 0〉 is a germinal
form but cannot be generated by iteration of substitutions. Moreover, germinal forms defined
by uncomputable {kν : ν ≥ 0} are also allowed.
The subformulae of A ∈ Lα = Lα(G) are defined in the standard manner. Then, Lα is
subformula-closed. It is proved by the double induction over ordinals α and over Iα0 - Iα2.
Lemma 2.1. Any subformula of A ∈ Lα belongs to Lα.
The set of formulae Lα is increasing up to α = ω, but it becomes constant after α = ω.
Theorem 2.1. (Stopping at ω) Let G be a fixed nonempty set of germinal forms. If α < ω,
then Lα ( Lα+1; and if ω ≤ α ≤ αo, then Lα = Lω = Pω (= ∪β<ωLβ).
Proof. Let 〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) : ν ≥ 0〉 be a germinal form in G. Since ∧〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈
L1 − L0, we have L0 ( L1. Let 1 ≤ α < ω. Suppose Lα−1 ( Lα. By I(α + 1)0, Lα ⊆ Lα+1.
Take A1, ..., Am ∈ Lα −Lα−1. Then, ∧〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) : ν ≥ 0〉 is in Fα+1 but not in Fα; so, it
is not in Lα. Hence, Lα ( Lα+1.
Consider the latter assertion of the theorem. By Iω0-Iω2, Pω ⊆ Lω. Now, we show Lω ⊆ Pω.
Take germsA1, ..., Am ∈ Pω. These germs belong toLγ for some γ < ω.Hence, ∧〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) :
ν ≥ 0〉 belongs to Fγ+1. Thus, any formulae generated by Iω0- Iω2 belong to Lβ for some β < ω.
Hence, Lω ⊆ Pω = ∪β<ωLβ. Now, by induction over α up to αo, we have Pω = Lω = Lα for all
α (ω ≤ α ≤ αo).
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The set Lα = Lα(G) (0 ≤ α ≤ ω, a countable G) is small in the sense that it remains
countable. Also, the depths of formulae in Lα are relevant to evaluations of infinitary concepts
such as common knowledge. We introduce the depth function δ over Lω, which assigns an
ordinal number to each formula in Lω. We define δ inductively along the definition of formulae
as follows:
d0: δ(p) = 0 for all propositional variables p;
d1: δ(¬A) = δ(A) + 1, and δ(A ⊃ B) = max(δ(A), δ(B)) + 1;
d2: δ(Bi(A)) = δ(A) + 1 for all i ∈ N ;
d3: δ(∧Φ) = sup{δ(C) + 1 : C ∈ Φ}.
Step d3 have several cases; Φmay be a finite set of formulae in Iα1 and Φmay be an α-permissible
sequence in Fα or generated by Iα2. If sup{δ(C) + 1 : C ∈ Φ} is a limit ordinal, then δ(∧Φ) =
sup{δ(C) : C ∈ Φ}, and otherwise, δ(∧Φ) = sup{δ(C) : C ∈ Φ} + 1. For any set of formulae
Γ, we define δ(Γ) = sup{δ(A) : A ∈ Γ}. Since L0 consists only of finitary formulae, we have
δ(L0) = sup{δ(A) : A ∈ L0} = ω. It follows from d0-d3 that for any A ∈ Lω, δ(C) < δ(A) for
any proper subformula C of A.
Consider the formula Bωi (p) = ∧〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 in Example 2.1.(1). Then, δ(Bωi (A)) = ω+1
and Bωi (p) ∈ L1 − L0, provided 〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ G. Any formula D in L1 including Bωi (A)
takes the form ω+k for some finite k, and this k may be arbitrary large; thus, δ(D) < ω+ω = ω2
and δ(L1) = ω2. The following theorem generalizes this observation.
Theorem 2.2. (Depths of formulae) Suppose that G has a germinal form 〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) :
ν ≥ 0〉 such that sup{δ(Cν(p1, ..., pm)) : ν ≥ 0} = ω.
(1): If 0 ≤ α < ω, then δ(A) < ω(α+ 1) for all A ∈ Lα; and δ(Lα) = ω(α+ 1).
(2): δ(A) < ω2 for all A ∈ Lω; and δ(Lω) = ω2.
Proof. (1): As mentioned above, δ(A) < ω for all A ∈ L0 and δ(L0) = ω. Let 1 ≤ α < ω, and
suppose the induction hypothesis that δ(A) < ωα for all A ∈ Lα−1 and δ(Lα−1) = ωα. Then,
we prove the assertions for α. First, we show that δ(A) < ω(α+ 1) for all A ∈ Lα.
Let ∧Φ ∈ Fα. Since δ(A) < ωα for all A ∈ Φ by the induction hypothesis, we have δ(∧Φ) ≤
ωα by d3. Thus, δ(A) ≤ ωα for any A ∈ Pα∪Fα. Now, consider Iα1. Suppose the other induction
hypothesis that for any immediate subformula C of A generated by Iα1, δ(C) ≤ ωα+k for some
k < ω. Then, by d1-d3, we have δ(A) ≤ ωα+ k′ for some k′ < ω.
Consider Iα2. The induction hypothesis is that δ(D) ≤ ωα+k and δ(∧Φ) ≤ ωα+k for some
k < ω. Then, δ(D ⊃ C) ≤ (ωα+k)+1 for any C ∈ Φ; and so δ(∧〈D ⊃ C : C ∈ Φ〉) ≤ (ωα+k)+1.
Also, δ(Bi(C)) ≤ (ωα+k)+1 for any C ∈ Φ; and so δ(∧〈Bi(C) : C ∈ Φ〉) ≤ (ωα+k)+1. The case
of Iα2.(iii) is similar. Thus, for a formula A generated by Iα2, it still holds that δ(A) ≤ ωα+ k′
for some k′ < ω. By these two paragraphs and induction, it holds that δ(A) < ω(α + 1) for all
A ∈ Lα.
For δ(Lα) = ω(α + 1), we show that for any k < ω, there is a formula C ∈ Lα so that
δ(C) ≥ ωα + k. Now, since δ(Lα−1) = ωα, there are formulae A1, ..., Am ∈ Lα−1 such that
δ(At) ≥ ω(α − 1) for t = 1, ...,m. Let 〈Cν(p1, ..., pm) : ν ≥ 0〉 be a germinal form given in the
assumption of the theorem. Consider ∧〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) : ν ≥ 0〉. Since sup{δ(Cν) : ν ≥ 0} = ω,
there is a ν for any k < ω such that δ(Cν(A1, ..., Am)) ≥ ω(α−1)+k. Hence, δ(∧〈Cν(A1, ..., Am) :
ν ≥ 0〉) = ω(α − 1) + ω = ωα. Then, using Iα1, for any k < ω, we find a formula F ∈ Lα so
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that δ(F ) ≥ ωα+ k. Thus, δ(Lα) ≥ supk(ωα+ k) = ωα+ ω = ω(α+ 1), and by the conclusion
of the previous paragraph, we have δ(Lα) = ω(α+ 1).
The first part of (2) follows (1), since Lω = ∪α<ωLα by Theorem 2.1. The second part follows
Lω = ∪α<ωLα and (1); indeed, δ(Lω) = δ(∪α<ωLα) = sup{δ(Lα) : α ≥ 0} = sup{ω(α + 1) :
ω > α ≥ 0} = ω2.
Theorem 2.2 is summarized in Table 2.1; our infinitary languages Lα (1 ≤ α ≤ ω) include
infinitary conjunctions but are not much larger than the finitary language L0. These extensions
are large enough for treatments of infinitary concepts mentioned above.
Table 2.1: Depths and cardinalities
L0 ( L1 ( · · · ( Lω
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0
depth ω < ω2 < ω2
Let us compare the above theorem with the infinitary logic approach. Following Kaneko-
Nagashima [20], we construct Lα (0 ≤ α ≤ αo) as follows. Let F0 = ∅, P0 = {p0,p1, ...}. Let
L0 = L0. For any α (1 ≤ α ≤ αo), assuming that Lβ are defined for any β < α, we define
KNα : Fα = {∧Φ : Φ is a countable subset of ∪β<αLβ},
and then Lα is defined by Iα0 with Fα and ∪β<αLβ and by Iα1-Iα2. We denote the set of
formulae for step α by Lα. The set L1 is already uncountable. Also, Lα does not stop at α = ω,
e.g., ∪β<αLβ ( Lω ( Lω+1 for all α ≤ ω. Then, δ(∪α<ωLα) = ω2 but δ(Lω) = ω2 + ω. This
sequence Lα increases up to the first uncountable ordinal ω1, where we assume αo ≥ ω1. Tanaka-
Ono [33] considered the smallest set, LTO, that is closed with respect to finitary operations on
¬, ⊃, Bi(·) and countable conjunctions:
TO: for any countable subset Φ of LTO, ∧Φ belongs to LTO.
Then, it holds that LTO = ∪β<ω1Lβ. This LTO is the smallest infinitary language in the sense
of Karp [19].
3 Epistemic Logics GL(Lα) (0 ≤ α ≤ ω)
We formulate a Hilbert-style proof theory and Kripke-semantics for epistemic logic GL(Lα) =
GL(Lα(G)) with 0 ≤ α ≤ ω and a countable set of germinal forms G. We state the soundness-
completeness theorem (Theorem 3.1), which will be proved in Section 6. We discuss the hierarchy
of GL(Lα(G)) with respect to both α and G, and provide four meta-lemmas to be used in Section
4.
3.1 Hilbert-style proof theory
The base logic for epistemic logic GL(Lα) is an infinitary classical logic defined by the following
four axiom schemata and two inference rules: for all formulae A,B,C,∧Φ in Lα,
L1: A ⊃ (B ⊃ A);
L2: (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C));
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L3: (¬A ⊃ ¬B) ⊃ ((¬A ⊃ B) ⊃ A);
L4: ∧Φ ⊃ C, where C ∈ Φ ;
Modus Ponens:
A ⊃ B A
B
; and ∧-rule: {A ⊃ C : C ∈ Φ}
A ⊃ ∧Φ .
We add the following epistemic axiom schemata and inference rule: for any A,C,∧Φ in Lα and
i ∈ N,
K: Bi(A ⊃ C) ⊃ (Bi(A) ⊃ Bi(C));
D: ¬Bi(¬A ∧A);
∧-Barcan: ∧Bi(Φ) ⊃ Bi(∧Φ);
Necessitation:
A
Bi(A)
.
The above axiomatization is an infinitary version of epistemic logic KDn with the ∧-Barcan
axiom (conjunctive analogue of the Barcan axiom ∀x(A(x)) ⊃ (∀xA(x)) in the first order
modal logic). Infinitary aspects are included in L4, ∧-rule, and ∧-Barcan, while the other
axioms and inference rules do not directly operate on infinitary structures. The definition of Lα
guarantees the well-definedness of L4, ∧-rule, and ∧-Barcan. Indeed, an instance ∧Φ ⊃ C for
L4 is in Lα for all C ∈ Φ by Lemma 2.1 and Iα1. The sequence 〈A ⊃ C : C ∈ Φ〉 of the upper
formulae in ∧-rule is α-permissible by Iα2.(i). Since Bi(∧Φ) ∈ Lα by Iα1 and ∧Bi(Φ) ∈ Lα by
Iα2.(ii), the formula ∧Bi(Φ) ⊃ Bi(∧Φ) of the ∧-Barcan axiom is in Lα. An equivalent form of
Axiom D is Bi(¬A) ⊃ ¬Bi(A), which is used in (20) in Section 5.
A proof P = 〈X,<; f〉 in GL(Lα) consists of a countable tree 〈X,<〉 and a function f : X →
Lα with the following requirements:
(o): 〈X,<〉 has no infinite path from its root;
(i): for each node x in 〈X,<〉, f(x) is a formula attached to x;
(ii): for each leaf x in 〈X,<〉, f(x) is an instance of the axiom schemata;
(iii): for each non-leaf x in 〈X,<〉,
{f(y) : y is an immediate successor of x}
f(x)
is an instance of the inference rules, MP, ∧-rule, and Nec.
Infinite branching is possible in (iii) to allow inferences with ∧-rule. Thus, the width of
(X,<) can be countably infinite and also the supremum of the depths can be infinite.
When A is attached to the root node of P = 〈X,<; f〉, we call P a proof of A. We say that
A is provable in GL(Lα), denoted by ` A, iff there is a proof of A in GL(Lα).
Lemma 3.1 states basic properties of the provability relation ` in GL(Lα). Since we adopt
a particular axiomatization of classical logic, these should be proved. Since the fragment deter-
mined by ⊃ and ¬ with L1-L3, MP is a standard formulation of classical proposition logic, a
proof of (1) is found in a textbook (e.g., Mendelson [24]). Since our system additionally includes
the connective ∧, (2) is crucial; a proof is given in Kaneko [18], Lemma 11.1. (3) is the converse
of ∧-Barcan, which is proved for any permissible or finite Φ: indeed, since ` ∧Φ ⊃ A for A ∈ Φ
by L4, we have ` Bi(∧Φ) ⊃ Bi(A) by Nec and K. Since this holds for all A ∈ Φ, we have,
by ∧-rule, ` Bi(∧Φ) ⊃ ∧Bi(Φ). Incidentally, when Φ is a finite set, the ∧-Barcan axiom is
unnecessary, i.e., ∧Bi(Φ) ⊃ Bi(∧Φ) is derived without using ∧-Barcan.
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Lemma 3.1. For any A,B,C,∧Φ ∈ Lα, and i ∈ N,
(1): ` A ⊃ B and ` B ⊃ C imply ` A ⊃ C;
(2): ` [A ∧B ⊃ C] ≡ A ⊃ (B ⊃ C);
(3): ` Bi(∧Φ) ⊃ ∧Bi(Φ).
Remark 3.1.(1): We can take the standard de Morgan method to define the disjunction formula
as ∨Φ := ¬∧ {¬A : A ∈ Φ} for a finite set of formulae Φ. For an α-permissible sequence Φ, this
could work when we extend Iα2 to include 〈¬A : A ∈ Φ〉 for any ∧Φ ∈ Lα, which is not included
in this paper.
(2): In GL(Lα), the substitution-rule is stated as follows: for any A[p] and B in Lα,
if ` A[p] and A[B] ∈ Lα, then ` A[B], (8)
where A[p] is a formula in Lα and A[B] is the formula obtained from A[p] by substituting B for
all occurrences of p. This fact will be used in Lemma 4.2.
3.2 Kripke completeness
A Kripke frame K = 〈W ;R1, ..., Rn〉 is an (n + 1)-tuple of a set of possible worlds and n
accessibility relations over W, where W is an arbitrary nonempty set and Ri is a serial binary
relation over W for each i ∈ N, i.e., for any w ∈ W, (w, u) ∈ Ri for some u ∈ W. A truth
assignment τ is a function from W × P0 to {>,⊥}. A pair (K, τ) is a Kripke model.
Let G be a fixed countable set of germinal forms. The valuation (K, τ, w) |= for w ∈ W
is inductively defined over Lα = Lα(G) as follows: for any A, C, ∧Φ ∈ Lα = Lα(G), and any
w ∈W,
V0: for any p ∈ P0, (K, w, τ) |= p⇐⇒ τ(w, p) = >;
V1: (K, τ, w) |= ¬A⇐⇒ (K, τ, w) 2 A;
V2: (K, τ, w) |= A ⊃ C ⇐⇒ (K, τ, w) 2 A or (K, τ, w) |= C;
V3: (K, τ, w) |= ∧Φ⇐⇒ (K, τ, w) |= A for all A ∈ Φ;
V4: (K, τ, w) |= Bi(A)⇐⇒ (K, τ, v) |= A for all v with wRiv.
Since Lα ⊆ Lω (α ≤ ω), the valuation (K, τ, w) |= is uniform over Lα for all α ≤ ω; that is, it is
defined over Lω and it can be restricted to Lα. For any A ∈ Lα, we write |= A iff (K, τ, w) |= A
for all K, w ∈W and τ.
We have the following soundness-completeness theorem; the proof of soundness is standard
and mentioned below, and completeness will be proved in Section 6. In the theorem, let G be a
fixed (at most countable) set of germinal forms.
Theorem 3.1. (Soundness and completeness for GL(Lα)) Let α be an ordinal with
0 ≤ α ≤ ω. For any A ∈ Lα, GL(Lα) ` A if and only if |= A.
Soundness (the only-if part) implies the contradiction-freeness of logic GL(Lα), which will be
used in the proof of completeness. Also, by soundness, we can see consistency of the conjunctions
of both germinal forms in (7) by the following Kripke model; both are true in the middle world.
© p1,¬p2
1,2
←−1 © p1, p21,2 −→2
© ¬p1, p2
1,2
Figure 3.1
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Soundness is proved as follows: Let P = 〈X,<; f〉 be a proof of A in GL(Lα). We prove
by induction on the tree structure of P from its leaves that |= C for each formula C = f(x)
attached to a node x in P. Each step is verified in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. (1): Let A be an instance of L1-L4 in Lα. Then |= A.
(2): Let A be an instance of Axioms K, D, ∧-Barcan in Lα. Then |= A.
(3): |= satisfies inference rules MP, ∧-rule, and Necessitation.
Proof. We see only the truthfulness of ∧-Barcan. Let (K, τ, w) |= ∧Bi(Φ). Then, (K, τ, w) |=
Bi(C) for any C ∈ Φ. Then, for any accessible v ∈W from w by Ri, it holds that for any C ∈ Φ,
(K, τ, v) |= C, equivalently, (K, τ, v) |= C; thus, (K, τ, v) |= ∧Φ holds for any accessible v ∈ W
by Ri. This implies (K, τ, w) |= Bi(∧Φ). Thus, (K, τ, w) |= ∧Bi(Φ) ⊃ Bi(∧Φ) is true.
For completeness, a difficulty is to show the existence of a maximal consistent set. For this
aim, Karp [19] assumes Axiom of Choice within her axiomatic system. We do not choose this
method; instead, we adopt the Q-filter method due to Rasiowa-Sikorski [29] and the multi-modal
extension given by Tanaka-Ono [33]. Here, a Q-filter plays the role of a maximal consistent set.
A sketch of a proof of our proof will be given in Section 6.1.
The above completeness result holds when we add Axioms T, 4, and 5 (or drop D), either in
combination or in isolation, and add the corresponding conditions, reflexivity, transitivity, and
euclidean (or drop seriality) on accessibility relation Ri (i ∈ N). Required modifications of the
proof will be stated in Remark 6.1. On the contrary, in our framework, we can evaluate these
axioms by studying explicit definability of each axiom, which will be undertaken in Section 4.
3.3 Conservativity and four meta-lemmas
We have the conservativity result between two logics with orders over α’s and G’s.
Theorem 3.2. (Conservativity) Let α ≤ β ≤ ω and G,G′ two sets of germinal forms with
G ⊆ G′. Then, for any A ∈ Lα(G), GL(Lα(G)) ` A if and only if GL(Lβ(G′)) ` A.
Proof. The if part is essential. Let GL(Lβ(G′)) ` A. Let (K, τ) be any serial Kripke model,
and w any world in K. By Theorem 3.1, we have (K, τ, w) |= A. Because of subformula-
closedness (Lemma 2.1) and the definition V0-V4 for (K, τ, w) |= , the statement (K, τ, w) |= A
is determined in Lα(G). Since this holds for any K, τ, w ∈ W, we have GL(Lα(G)) ` A by
Theorem 3.1.
By Theorem 3.2, our infinitary logics form the hierarchy with the conservative extension
relation⇒, described as in Table 3.1: each row is a series of logics with the same G, corresponding
to (1), and each column is a series with the same α with G ⊆ G′ ⊆ G′′. The weakest logic is
GL(L0) = KDn and the strongest is GL(Lω(G)) in the row with the same G. It holds that for
each fixed A ∈ Lω(G), we can find the smallest αA < ω and GA ⊆ G such that A ∈ LαA(GA);
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then Theorem 3.2 implies that GL(LαA(GA)) ` A⇐⇒ GL(Lω(G)) ` A.
Table 3.1 Hierarchy of infinitary epistemic logics
GL(L0) ⇒ GL(L1(G)) ⇒ · · · ⇒ GL(Lω(G))
 
GL(L1(G′)) GL(Lω(G′))
 
GL(L1(G′′)) ⇒ · · · ⇒ GL(Lω(G′′))
In terms of languages, the arrows ⇒ and  are strict; Lα(G) is a proper subset of Lβ(G′)
whenever α < β or G ( G′. In terms of provability, it is more subtle. Consider positive
introspection (Example 2.1.(1)) and let G = {〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉}, and G′ = {〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉,
〈Bνi (p∨¬p) : ν ≥ 0〉}. Then, the vertical relation between GL(L1(G)) and GL(L1(G′)) collapses
in the sense that for any A′ ∈ L1(G′), there is a formula A ∈ L1(G) such that GL(L1(G′)) ` A′ ≡
A.3 When Go = {〈Bνi (p ∨ ¬p) : ν ≥ 0〉}, we have the entire collapse result from GL(Lα(Go)) to
GL(L0) = KDn for any α ≥ 0, though Lα(Go) contains infinite formulae.
Conversely, both arrows can be strict. Here, we give only two examples. The strictness holds
between GL(L0(G)) = KDn and GL(L1(G)); we show by Lemma 3.3, given below, that for any
A ∈ L0(G) = L0,
GL(L1(G)) ` A ⊃ Bωi (p) =⇒ GL(L1(G)) ` ¬A. (9)
Thus, there is no formula A ∈ L0(G) such that GL(L1(G)) ` A ≡ Bωi (p). Now, let G′ =
{〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉, 〈Bνj (p) : ν ≥ 0〉} (i 6= j). It holds that for any A ∈ L1(G),
GL(L1(G′)) ` A ⊃ Bωj (p) =⇒ GL(L1(G)) ` ¬A. (10)
A proof is given in the working paper version of this paper.4 Then, there is no formula A ∈ L1(G)
such that GL(L1(G′)) ` A ≡ Bωj (p). However, a general study of the hierarchy in Table 2.1 is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
Here, we give four meta-results; two are known in a finitary KDn (cf., Kaneko-Suzuki [22])
and the other two are new. First, the depth lemma for GL(L0) = KDn is converted to GL(Lα)
by Theorem 3.2. Recall the depth measure δ given in Section 2.5
Lemma 3.3. (Depth lemma) Let A and C be two formulae in L0. Let (i1, ..., ik) be a sequence
of agents in N and δ(A) < k. In GL(Lα), if ` A ⊃ Bi1 ...Bik(C), then ` ¬A or ` C.
Assertion (9) is proved by this lemma. Let GL(L1(G)) ` A ⊃ Bωi (p) and k > δ(A). Then,
GL(L1(G)) ` A ⊃ Bki (p), which implies ` ¬A by Lemma 3.3.
The second result is an extension of the epistemic disjunction lemma for KDn. The following
lemma is stated in GL(Lα), but can be proved in the same manner as in [22], i.e., by constructing
a counter-model based upon Theorem 3.1. Recall Remark 3.1 about disjunction ∨.
Lemma 3.4. (Epistemic Disjunction lemma) Let A,C ∈ Lα. In GL(Lα), ` Bi(A) ∨Bi(C) if
and only if ` Bi(A) or ` Bi(C).
3A referee gave a similar example to show the collapse of  .
4https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2018/04/No.E1705-2.pdf
5In [22], the epistemic depth to count only the nested occurrences of Bi, i ∈ N is used for this lemma.
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The third result enables us to move forward/backward from the beliefs and their contents.
This will be used in Section 5.
Lemma 3.5. (Scope Lemma) Let A,C ∈ Lα. In GL(Lα), ` Bi(A) ⊃ Bi(C) if and only if
` A ⊃ C.
Proof. The if part is straightforward. We show the contrapositive of the only-if part. Suppose
0 A ⊃ C. By Theorem 3.1, there is a model (K, τ) such that (K, τ, w) |= A but (K, τ, w) 2 C
for some world w ∈ W. Now, we add a new world w∗ to W so that W ∗ = W ∪ {w∗}, R∗i =
Ri ∪ {(w∗, w)} and R∗j = Ri ∪ {(w∗, w∗)} for all j 6= i. We extend τ to τ∗ : W ∗ × P0 → {>,⊥}
so that τ∗(u, p) = τ(u, p) for all (u, p) ∈ W × P0 and τ∗(w∗, p) is arbitrary for all p ∈ P0. We
have a new model (K∗, τ∗). In this new model, all valuations are preserved from (K, τ). Since
agent i refers only to w at w∗, we have (K, τ, w∗) |= Bi(A) but (K, τ, w∗) 2 Bi(C). Hence,
(K, τ, w∗) 2 Bi(A) ⊃ Bi(C). By Theorem 3.1, 0 Bi(A) ⊃ Bi(C).
Using this lemma and Theorem 3.1, we can prove that in GL(Lα), 0 Bi(p) ⊃ BiBi(p) and
0 BiBi(p) ⊃ Bi(p). Thus, Axioms 4 and T are not provable in our logic. Nevertheless, `
Bωi (p) ⊃ BiBωi (p) but 0 BiBωi (p) ⊃ Bωi (p) in GL(Lα) with α ≥ 1. This unprovability is shown
by the counter-model:
© p −→i © ¬p −→i © pi
This is a counter-model also for Bωi B
ω
i (p) ⊃ Bωi (p) in GL(L2(G)).
The next lemma, which is the dual of ∧-rule, will be used in Section 5.
Lemma 3.6. (Infinitary conjunctions) Let A,∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ Lα. In GL(Lα), if ` A ⊃ ¬Cν
for some ν ≥ 0, then ` A ⊃ ¬ ∧ 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉.
Proof. Let ` A ⊃ ¬Cν for some ν ≥ 0. Let (K, τ) be any model and w any world in W
with (K, τ, w) |= A. By Theorem 3.1, (K, τ, w) |= ¬Cν , i.e., (K, τ, w) 2 Cν . Thus, (K, τ, w) 2
∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉, equivalently, (K, τ, w) |= ¬∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. Thus, (K, τ, w) |= A ⊃ ¬∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉.
Since (K, τ) and w are arbitrary, we have, by Theorem 3.1, ` A ⊃ ¬ ∧ 〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉.
4 Application 1: Evaluations of Various Epistemic Concepts
From the viewpoint of epistemic logics, the choices of Axioms T, 4, and 5 are of great importance.
Completeness is one criterion but is neutral in the sense that our logics accommodate all these
axioms, as stated after Theorem 3.1. Axioms 4 and 5 include infinitary aspects, though they
are formulated in a finitary logic. Here, we ask whether each can be explicitly defined in
our infinitary logics. The answers differ for T, 4, and 5. Then, we consider the possibility
of embedding a logic with such an axiom to GL(Lα). A similar consideration is given to the
concept of common knowledge. In the end of Section 4.3, we give a small summary of differences
between our approach and modal µ-calculus.
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4.1 Explicit definabilities of Axioms T, 4, and 5 in GL(Lα)
We fix one agent i throughout Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Also, a set of germinal forms G is fixed here.
We begin with the following requirements for a target formula Fi(p) in Lα: for any A,C ∈ Lα,
F0i : Fi(A) ∈ Lα; (11)
FEi : ` Fi(A) ⊃ Bi(A);
FKi : ` Fi(A ⊃ C) ⊃ (Fi(A) ⊃ Fi(C));
FNi : ` A implies ` Fi(A),
where Fi(p) contains only propositional variable p and ` is the provability relation in GL(Lα).
F0i means that Fi(·) is applicable to any A ∈ Lα, and FEi that Fi(·) is an extension of the belief
operator Bi(·). FKi and FNi correspond to Axiom K and Nec. The corresponding requirement
to Axiom D, ` ¬Fi(A∧¬A), is implied by the contrapositive of FEi ` ¬Bi(A∧¬A) ⊃ ¬Fi(A∧¬A)
and Axiom D for Bi(·).
The above requirements are conditions not only for Fi(p) but also for Lα, since formulae
A,C vary in Lα. Lemma 4.1 states that when Fi(p) ∈ Lα satisfies F0i, Fi(p) is finitary or α = ω.
Lemma 4.1. If F0i holds for Fi(p) ∈ Lα, then δ(Fi(p)) < ω or α = ω.
Proof. Let δ(Fi(p)) ≥ ω. Then, some infinitary conjunction ∧Φ with δ(∧Φ) ≥ ω is included in
Fi(p). Since Fi(p) contains only propositional variable p, so does ∧Φ. Since Fi(Fi(p)) ∈ Lα by F0i
and ∧Φ(Fi(p)) is a subformula of Fi(Fi(p)), it holds by Lemma 2.1 that ∧Φ(Fi(p)) ∈ Lα. But
δ(∧Φ(Fi(p))) ≥ ω + ω. This implies δ(Fi(Fi(p))) ≥ ω · 2. In general, we can prove by induction
on β ≥ 1 that δ(F βi (p)) > ω · β for all β < ω. Using F0i, F βi (p) ∈ Lα for any β < ω. Thus,
ω2 ≤ supβ<ω δ(F βi (p)) ≤ δ(Lα). By Theorem 2.2, we have α = ω.
Another lemma is about the consistency of Fi(p). We say that a formula A is consistent in
GL(Lα) iff 0 A ⊃ ¬p ∧ p in GL(Lα). A formula A is not consistent if and only if ` ¬A.
Lemma 4.2. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ ω. Any Fi(p) satisfying FNi is consistent in GL(Lα).
Proof. Suppose that Fi(p) is not consistent in GL(Lα), i.e., ` ¬Fi(p). By the substitution-
rule mentioned in Remark 3.1.(2), it holds that ` ¬Fi(p ⊃ p). On the other hand, by FNi,
` Fi(p ⊃ p). This is impossible because GL(Lα) is contradiction-free, as remarked just after
Theorem 3.1.
The conditions corresponding to Axioms T, 4, and 5 are as follows: for any A ∈ Lα,
FTi : ` Fi(A) ⊃ A; (12)
F4i : ` Fi(A) ⊃ Fi(Fi(A));
F5i : ` ¬Fi(A) ⊃ Fi(¬Fi(A)).
We look for a formula Fi(p) satisfying each of these in addition to F0i to FNi. Whether or not
such an Fi(p) exists is explicit definability of Axioms T, 4, and/or 5 in GL(Lα).
In the case of Axiom T, we observe that Bi(p) ∧ p satisfies F0i, FEi, and FTi, and it is
also the deductively weakest among such formulae; we say that Fi(p) is the deductively weakest
among the formulae satisfying given conditions iff it satisfies them and for any F ′i (p) among
those formulae, ` F ′i (A) ⊃ Fi(A) for any A ∈ Lα.
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Theorem 4.1. (Explicit definability for Axiom T) Let 0 ≤ α ≤ ω. In GL(Lα), Bi(p) ∧ p is the
deductively weakest among the formulae satisfying F0i, FEi, and FTi.
Proof. We can verify that Bi(p) ∧ p satisfies F0i, FEi, and FTi in GL(Lα). Let F ′i (p) satisfy
F0i, FEi, and FTi. By FEi and FTi, ` F ′i (A) ⊃ Bi(A) and ` F ′i (A) ⊃ A. By ∧-rule, ` F ′i (A) ⊃
Bi(A) ∧ A, which holds for any A ∈ Lα. Thus, Bi(p) ∧ p is deductively weakest among Fi(p)
satisfying F0i, FEi, and FTi.
This theorem holds for every α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω). Also, we can include FKi and FNi as required
conditions in Theorem 4.1. Note that G is arbitrary up to this theorem.
Now, we go to the evaluation of Axiom 4. We assume that G contains Bωi (p) = ∧〈Bνi (p) :
ν ≥ 0〉 with B0i (p) = Bi(p).
Theorem 4.2. (Explicit definability for Axiom 4) (1): Let Fi(p) ∈ Lα satisfy F0i, FEi, FKi,
FNi, and F4i. Then α = ω and ` Fi(p) ⊃ Bωi (p) in GL(Lω).
(2): Bωi (p) is the deductively weakest among the formulae Fi(p) satisfying F0i, FEi, FKi, FNi,
and F4i in GL(Lω).
Proof. (1): We prove GL(Lα) ` Fi(p) ⊃ Bνi (p) for all ν < ω by induction over ν ≥ 0. For
ν = 0, the claim is FEi. Suppose the induction hypothesis that ` Fi(p) ⊃ Bνi (p). Then, by F0i,
FNi, and FKi, we have ` Fi(Fi(p)) ⊃ Fi(Bνi (p)). By this and ` Fi(p) ⊃ Fi(Fi(p)) by F4i, we
have ` Fi(p) ⊃ Fi(Bνi (p)). Since ` Fi(Bνi (p)) ⊃ BiBνi (p) by FEi, we have ` Fi(A) ⊃ Bν+1i (A).
Let δ(Fi(p)) < ω. Take a ν > δ(Fi(p)). By Lemma 3.3, we have ` ¬Fi(p) or ` p in GL(L0).
The first is impossible since Fi(p) is consistent in GL(Lα) by Lemma 4.2. The second is also
impossible. Hence, δ(Fi(p)) ≥ ω. By Lemma 4.1, α = ω. Using F0i, FEi, FKi, FNi, F4i, we have
GL(Lω) ` Fi(p) ⊃ Bνi (p) for all ν < ω. Thus, GL(Lω) ` Fi(p) ⊃ Bωi (p) by ∧-rule.
(2): We can verify that F0i, FEi, FKi, FNi, F4i hold for Bωi (p) in GL(Lω). By (1) of this
theorem, it is deductively weakest among Fi(p) satisfying these requirements.
In contrast to Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2 states that Axiom 4 is explicitly definable only
in GL(Lω). It has the implication that ` Bωki (p) ⊃ Bωi (Bωki (p)) for any k < ω in GL(Lω),
though 0 Bνi (p) ⊃ BiBνi (p) for ν < ω; i.e., after ω, further introspection carries no additional
information. F4i with the closure property F0i directly brings us to infinity.
We showed that both Axiom T and 4 can be explicitly defined in our system, though the
depth requirements differs. For Axiom 5, the answer is entirely negative, independent of the
choices of α and G.
Theorem 4.3. (Explicit indefinability of Axiom 5) There is no consistent formula Fi(p) in
GL(Lα) (0 ≤ α ≤ ω) such that it satisfies FEi and F5i.
Proof. Suppose that there is some consistent formula Fi(p) in GL(Lα) satisfying FEi and
F5i. Then, F5i is equivalent to ` Fi(p) ∨ Fi(¬Fi(p)), which further implies, by FEi, ` Bi(p) ∨
Bi(¬Fi(p)). By Lemma 3.4, we have ` Bi(p) or ` Bi(¬Fi(p)). By Lemma 3.5, we have ` p or
` ¬Fi(p). The former is impossible; and so is the latter because Fi(p) is consistent in GL(Lα).
Thus, Axiom 5 cannot be defined explicitly by a formula in GL(Lα). However, it can still be
treated as a logical axiom keeping completeness, as remarked in Section 3.2.
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4.2 Faithful embedding
The explicit definability results for Axioms T and 4 may imply that an extension GL(Lα) with
Axiom T or 4 is faithfully embedded into GL(Lα). For Axiom T, the embedding result is available
from Lα to Lα for any α in terms of language, but for Axiom 4, it can be only from L0 to Lω.
We have no embedding result for Axiom 5.6 Here, we give a full embedding argument in the
case of Axiom 4, and a sketch for the embedding result in the case of Axiom T.
Consider the case of Axiom 4 and recall F 4i (p) = B
ω
i (p). Let 〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ G. We define
the F 4i -translator ψ
4 : L0 → Lω = Lω(G) inductively as follows: for all A,C ∈ L0 and ∧Φ ∈ L0,
E0: ψ4(p) = p if p ∈ P0;
E10: ψ4(¬A) = ¬ψ4(A);
E20: ψ4(A ⊃ C) = ψ4(A) ⊃ ψ4(C);
E30: ψ4(∧Φ) = ∧ψ4(Φ);
E40: ψ4(Bi(A)) = F 4i (ψ
4(A)) and ψ4(Bj(A)) = Bj(ψ4(A)) for j 6= i.
The following theorem states that KDn+ 4i is faithfully embedded to GL(Lω). The depth of the
embedded fragment ψ4(L0) is δ(ψ
4(L0)) = supν<ω ψ
4(Bνi (A)) = supν<ω(ω · ν) = ω2 = δ(Lω).
Theorem 4.4. (Faithful embedding of KD4 to GL(Lω)) (1): For any A ∈ L0, KDn+4i ` A in
if and only if GL(Lω) ` ψ4(A).
(2): For any A ∈ L0, there exists an α < ω such that KDn+4i ` A if and only if GL(Lα) ` ψ4(A).
Proof. (1): Take an arbitrary Kripke model (K, τ) for KDn, which is also a model for GL(Lω).
We replace the accessibility relation Ri in (K, τ) by its transitive closure Rtri , and we denote the
resulting Kripke model by (Ktr, τ). Then, KDn + 4i is Kripke complete with respect to those
models (Ktr, τ). Then, we prove by induction on the length of A ∈ L0 that for any world
w ∈ W, (Ktr, τ, w) |= A if and only if (K, τ, w) |= ψ4(A). We consider only case of A = Bi(C).
Let (Ktr, τ, w) |= Bi(C). Then, (Ktr, τ, v) |= C for any v ∈ Rtri (w). By the induction hypothesis,
(K, τ, v) |= ψ4(C) for any v ∈ Rtri (w). Since Rtri is the transitive closure of Ri, it is equivalent to
that (K, τ, v) |= ψ4(C) for any v reachable from w by Ri. This means (K, τ, w) |= Bνi (ψ4(C)) for
any ν ≥ 0, i.e., (K, τ, w) |= Bωi (ψ4(C)), implying (K, τ, w) |= ψ4(Bi(C)). Tracing this argument
back, we have a proof of the converse. For the cases of other connectives, the argument is similar.
(2): For a given A ∈ L0, we find the maximal iterations, α, of Bi(·) inside A; then, by Theorem
3.2 (conservativity), KDn+ 4i ` A ⇐⇒ GL(Lα) ` ψ4(A).
Now, consider the embedding of Axiom T to GL(Lα). Now, we do not need 〈Bνi (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈
G. In this case, we use the translator ψT based on F Ti (p) = Bi(p)∧p. Then, the formal definition
of ψT : L0 −→ L0 is obtained by the same rules E0, E10-E30, but E40 with F Ti (p) = Bi(p) ∧ p
instead of F 4i (p). This translator ψ
T is also uniquely defined. Then, we have
KDn + Ti ` A⇐⇒ KDn ` ψT (A). (13)
This embedding result is essentially the same as the result given in Kaneko [18], Section 5.
6Halpern et al. [11] consider two modalities, one called belief (KD45) and the other called knowledge (S5),
and discuss whether the latter can be reduced to the former via various notions of definability. In contrast, our
embedding results are about reducing one logic system (e.g., KD4) to GL(Lω).
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However, the result (13) holds, under a minor additional condition, from GL(Lα)+Ti to
GL(Lα) for all α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω). When α ≥ 1, the definition ψT over Lα needs one requirement
on the set of germinal forms G to be closed under the translation ψT :
〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ G =⇒ 〈ψT (Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ G. (14)
This implies that G is countably infinite.
We have the following lemma. Proofs of this lemma and the next theorem are found in the
working paper version of this paper.7
Lemma 4.3. ψT : Lω → Lω is uniquely defined by E0, E1α to E4α (α ≤ ω).
Now, we have the following theorem, where GL(Lα)+Ti denotes the logic GL(Lα) plus
Axiom T for Bi(·). Then, the logic GL(Lα)+Ti is faithfully embedded into GL(Lα) with the
translator ψT . Let 0 ≤ α ≤ ω.
Theorem 4.5. For any A ∈ Lα, GL(Lα)+Ti ` A if and only if GL(Lα) ` ψT (A).
Theorem 4.5 compares logic GL(Lα)+Ti with the fragment ψT (GL(Lα)) obtained by the
translator ψT . It is the main difference from Theorem 4.4 that the translator ψT does not change
the layer, i.e., it embeds Lα to Lα for each α, while ψ4 embeds L0 to Lω. We remark here that
Iα2.(iii) is used in proving Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.5, but otherwise, it is not needed for any
other results in the present paper.
4.3 Evaluation of common knowledge in GL(Lα)
The concept of common knowledge can be formulated in a fixed-point extension of a finitary
epistemic logic, often S5-type, (Halpern, et al. [8], Meyer-van der Hoek [25]). Here, we consider
its KDn variant, and show that this fixed-point logic is embedded to GL(Lα).
The finitary language L0 is extended by adding the unary operator symbolCN (·) to the basic
symbols listed in Section 2.1, and use LCN to denote the extended language. A formula CN (A)
means the common knowledge of A among the group of agents N . The common knowledge logic
CK(LCN ) is defined to be the extension of KDn with the language LCN by adding the following
axiom scheme and an inference rule: for any A,D ∈ LCN ,
Axiom CKA: CN (A) ⊃ [A ∧ ∧i∈NBiCN (A)];
Rule CKI:
D ⊃ [A ∧ ∧i∈NBi(D)]
D ⊃ CN (A) .
A (finite) proof is defined in the same way as in Section 3.1. In this logic, it is shown by repeated
use of CKA that ` CN (A) ⊃ BνN (A) for all ν ≥ 0, where BνN (A) is defined in (2). Thus, CN (A)
contains the common knowledge of A. Rule CKI means that if any D has the property described
by CKA, then D contains CN (A), i.e., CN (A) is the deductively weakest among the formulae
having the property.
In CK(LCN ), the formula CN (A) is not explicitly expressed in terms of B1(·), ...,Bn(·) in
CK(LCN ), but CN (A) is implicitly definable. To see this, we add another operator symbol
7https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2018/04/No.E1705-2.pdf
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C′N (·) to the language LCN and assume CKA, CKI for C′N (·). By CKA for C′N (A) and CKI
with D = C′N (A), we have ` C′N (A) ⊃ CN (A). We have the converse by a parallel argument.
Thus, ` C′N (A) ≡ CN (A).
In contrast, our infinitary logic GL(Lα) allows us to express the concept of common knowl-
edge explicitly, i.e., BωN (A) = ∧〈BνN (A) : ν ≥ 0〉, assuming 〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 ∈ G. In a similar
manner to Section 4.1, we look for a formula F (p) ∈ Lα in GL(Lα) having the following prop-
erties: for A ∈ Lα and D ∈ Lα, F0 with the replacement of Fi(p) by F (p) and
FCAα : ` F (A) ⊃ A ∧ [∧i∈NBi(F (A))];
FCIα : if ` D ⊃ A ∧ [∧i∈NBi(D)], then ` D ⊃ F (A).
These require F (p) satisfy the properties corresponding to CKA and CKI in CK(LCN ).
The following theorem states that the common knowledge is explicitly definable in GL(Lα).
Since it follows from FCAα and Nec, K for Bi(·)’s that F (A) is an infinitary formula, Lemma
4.1 is applied to F (p), the explicit definability holds only for α = ω.
Theorem 4.6. (Explicit definability of common knowledge). In GL(Lω), the common knowledge
F (p) = ∧〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉 is a unique, up to the deductive equivalence, formula satisfying FCAω
and FCIω.
Now, we look at the relation between CK(LCN ) and GL(Lα). The Kripke semantics for
CK(LCN ) is the same as that for GL(Lα). Here, M = ((W ;R1, ..., Rn), τ) is a serial model as
in Section 3.2 and the valuation of CN (A) is defined in the same way except the following:
(M,w) |= CN (A) iff (M, v) |= A for all CN -reachable v from w,
where v is CN -reachable from w iff there is a finite sequence 〈w0, ..., wm〉 (m ≥ 0) in W such
that w0 = w, wm = v, and for all k = 0, ...,m− 1, (wk, wk+1) ∈ Ri for some i ∈ N.
We have the completeness/soundness result for CK(LCN ), which is a variant of the well-
known result (cf., Fagin et al. [8]); for any A ∈ LCN , A is valid if and only if CK(LCN ) ` A.
Now we show that CK(LCN ) can be faithfully embedded into GL(Lω) with the translator
ψCN : LCN → Lω by E0 and E10 - E30, and
E40 : ψ
CN (Bi(A)) = Bi(ψ
CN (A)) for all i ∈ N ;
EC : ψCN (CN (A)) = B
ω
N (ψ
CN (A)).
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. (Faithful embedding of CK(LCN ) to GL(Lω)) (1): For any A ∈ LCN , CK(LCN ) `
A if and only if GL(Lω) ` ψCN (A).
(2): For any A ∈ LCN , there exists an αA < ω such that CK(LCN ) ` A if and only if
GL(Lα) ` ψCN (A).
Proof. (1) can be proved by observing that with the translation ψCN , the Kripke semantics
for CK(LCN ) and for GL(Lω) are the same. For (2), we take the maximum nested depth α of
CN (·) in A ∈ LCN . By Theorem 3.2, we have GL(Lα) ` ψCN (A) ⇐⇒ GL(Lω) ` ψCN (A). By
part (1) and this, we have (2).
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This theorem is similar to Theorem 4.4 with respect to the depths required, that is, the
finitary logics are faithfully embedded to GL(Lω).
It may be relevant to see the rank function given by Alberucci et al. [2] in this context; this
concept is defined in modal µ-calculus, but Alberucci [1] shows that CK(LCN ) (based on K-type)
can be regarded as a fragment of modal µ-calculus. In our context with G = {〈BνN (p) : ν ≥ 0〉},
their problem is to find a function f over LCN assigning an ordinal to each formula in LCN
having the following two properties: for all A ∈ LCN ,
(a): if B is a proper subformula of A, then f(B) < f(A);
(b): f(CN (A)) > f(BνN (A)) for all ν < ω.
The second is motivated by the fact that ` CN (A) ⊃ BνN (A) for all ν ≥ 0. In the present context,
their rank function f is defined by the inductive definition of our depth function δ by replacing
the second part of d3 by: f(CN (A)) = f(A) + ω for all A ∈ LCN . This function f satisfies the
requirements (a) and (b). Furthermore, we have:
f(A) = δ(ψCN (A)) for all A ∈ LCN . (15)
Thus, their rank function for LCN corresponds to our depth function δ for Lω. In the same
manner as Theorem 4.7.(2), we can evaluate the depth for each A ∈ LCN . Since each A ∈ LCN
has the maximum nested depth α < ω of CN (·), it follows from (15) and Theorem 2.2 that for
each A ∈ LCN , there is an αA < ω such that ωαA ≤ f(A) = δ(ψCN (A)) < ω(αA + 1).
We remark that Theorem 4.7 does not hold for generic common knowledge (Sato [30], Arte-
mov [4], Antonakos [3]). In one version of such logics, the language LJ is obtained from LCN by
adding J(·). Here, we consider the extension JL(LJ) of CK(LCN ) in which the belief operators
Bi(·) obey KDn and J(·) obeys S4 axioms (including Nec), and
Interaction axiom (IA): J(A) ⊃ ∧i∈NBi(A) for all A ∈ LJ.
The expression J(A) is interpreted as meaning that A is “obvious fact” in that it is known to
all agents. Interaction Axiom connects J(A) to ∧i∈NBi(A), but the converse is not guaranteed.
Also, JL(LJ) ` J(A) ⊃ CN (A); since ` JJ(A) ⊃ ∧i∈NBi(J(A)) by plugging J(A) to A in IA
and ` J(A) ≡ JJ(A) by the S4 axioms for J(·), we have ` J(A) ⊃ ∧i∈NBi(J(A)), and since this
is the upper formula of CKI, we have ` J(A) ⊃ CN (A).
In JL(LJ), the operator J(A) is not explicitly defined in terms of B1(·), ...,Bn(·) and CN (·).
Contrary to this, in GL(Lω), there are multiple formulae satisfying the corresponding properties
to the axioms for J(·). The formula F (p) = BωN (p) enjoys the S4 properties and IA, but for
another propositional variable q 6= p, the formula F ′(p) = BωN (p)∧BωN (q) also enjoys all of these
properties, but is deductively stronger than F (p).
A more general development in the fixed-point logic literature is given in the study of modal
µ-calculus (cf., Enqvist, et al. [7]). Our approach looks similar in that germinal forms can be
based on iterated substitutions. However, the two approaches also have significant difference,
as summarized below.
(i) The definition of germinal forms in Section 2 allows non-constructive germinal forms, and
even when germinal forms are constructive in terms of iterated substitutions, they may include
negative occurrences of propositional variables for substitution. See Example 2.1.(3). In con-
trast, the positivity assumption that the µ-operator (and ν-operator) is applied only to a formula
is crucial. See Enqvist, et al. [7], Section 3, and Fountaine [9] for related problems.
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(ii) The required depth for the language of GL(Lα) is ω(α+1) (0 ≤ α < ω) and that of GL(Lω)
is ω2. On the other hand, Alberrucci et al. [2] showed that their notion of ordinal ranks to eval-
uate the depths of formulae in modal µ-calculus and it goes up to ωω. Our germinal forms are
sequences in GL(L0) and are assumed to be uniform in generating the series GL(L0), GL(L1), ...
In modal µ-calculus, this is regarded as corresponding to A(µx.A(x)), A2(µx.A(x)), ..., and the
µ-operator is also applied to formulae already including the µ-operator, that is, µy(µx.A(x, y))
as long as the variable condition is satisfied. The difference in the required depths is caused by
these facts.
5 Application 2: Rationalizability in Game Theory
We apply our framework to the study of decision making in game theory, called the theory of
rationalizability (cf., Bernheim [5], Pearce [28], and Osborne-Rubinstein [27]). This applica-
tion has two purposes. First, we show that our framework enables us to formalize each agent’s
decision-making process in terms of agents’ logical inference. Second, it gives a concrete example
of a discourse requiring GL(Lα) exactly with α = 2, which differs from the infinitary concepts
discussed in Section 4. Also, the theory requires more complex germinal forms involving dis-
junctions, and we will use the sound/completeness theorem (Theorem 3.1) to prove one step
(Lemma 5.4) of the main theorem (Theorem 5.2). We remark that Axiom D is used for (20) in
this section.
A 2-person game is given as G = ({1, 2}, S1, S2, g1, g2), where 1 and 2 are agents, Si is a
finite nonempty set of available actions, and gi : S1 × S2 → R (reals) is the payoff function of
agent i = 1, 2. Before the actual play of the game, each agent chooses his action to be played
without knowing the other’s choice. The focus is on this ex ante decision making.
A crucial component for rationalizability is the best response property: an action si ∈ Si for
agent i is a best response to an action tj ∈ Sj for agent j iff gi(si; tj) ≥ gi(s′i; tj) for all s′i ∈ Si,
where we often write gi(s1, s2) as gi(si; sj). We stipulate that when agent i is focused, the other
agent is denoted by j. We say that an action si ∈ Si for agent i is rationalizable iff si is a best
response to some action s1j ∈ Sj for j, and s1j is a best response to some s2i , and s2i is a best
response to some s3j , and so on ad infinitum.
8 The referred action st+1i for t is interpreted as
a prediction inferred in the interpersonal beliefs of depth t in the mind of agent i. Here, this
interpretation is informal; to make it explicit, we go to our formal system.
To express the above game theoretical concepts, we add the following atomic propositions
as propositional variables to the basic symbols listed in the beginning of Section 2: for i = 1, 2,
preference symbols Pri(s1, s2 : t1, t2) for (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ S1 × S2;
decision symbols Ii(si) for si ∈ Si.
The atomic proposition Pri(s1, s2 : t1, t2) intends to mean that “agent i weakly prefers (s1, s2)
to (t1, t2)”, which is also written as Pri(si; sj : ti; tj) with {i, j} = {1, 2}. The expression Ii(si)
means that “si is a possible final decision for agent i”. The finitary language L0 is now defined
8In the literature, this is called point-rationalizability, which is the degenerate version of ”rationalizability”
allowing mixed strategies with the interpretation that they express probabilistic beliefs about the other’s choices
(Bernheim [5], Peace [28]). In the recent game-theory literature, rationalizability is studied in a state space with
probabilistic (common) beliefs (cf., Tan and Werlang [31] and Hu [13]). However, this approach does not explicitly
formulate logical inferences as in proof theory, since it does not have a formal language.
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by Iα0 and Iα1 with α = 0 based on these additional symbols and the list of primitive symbols
in Section 2. In L0, the best response property is described as a formula: for si ∈ Si and tj ∈ Sj ,
Bsti(si; tj) := ∧{Pri(si; tj : s′i; tj) : s′i ∈ Si}. (16)
For rationalizability, we use two types of germinal forms. The first is the germinal forms for epis-
temic infinite regresses 〈Irνi [p1, p2] : ν ≥ 0〉 in Example 2.1.(2). We denote GIR = {〈Irνi [p1, p2] :
ν ≥ 0〉 : i = 1, 2}. The other will be introduced after giving the decision making criterion.
Consider the following criterion for decision making by agent i :
DRi : ∧si∈Si(Ii(si) ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ij(tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉).
This is used in his mind, i.e., DRi occurs in the scope Bi(·). It states that agent i makes some
prediction about the other’s decision tj and his decision si is a best response to the prediction
tj . The disjunction ∨tj∈Sj is specific to the rationalizability theory and to capture the idea of
rationalization.
The criterion DRi is self-insufficient in that it lacks the description of how agent j infers tj in
agent i’s mind; that is, agent i needs to have a certain criterion for it. We assume that agent i has
the same (symmetric) criterion, DRj , to predict a possible tj for the imaginary agent j in agent
i’s mind. This is formally expressed as BiBj(DRj ). However, this formula includes Bi(Ii(ti)) in
the innermost DRj , and by the parallel argument to the above, BiBjBi(D
R
i ) is required. Unless
we force this argument to stop at some finite level, this leads to an infinite regress:
Bi(D
R
i )→ BiBj(DRj )→ BiBjBi(DRi )→ ... (17)
The conjunction of this sequence is exactly the infinite regress formula Iri[DR] = Iri[DR1 , D
R
2 ].
We regard the infinite regress Iri[DR] as a system of equations with unknowns I1(s1) and
I2(s2); agent i may find some formulae so that they could be regarded as solutions for Iri[DR].
To discuss solutions for Iri[DR], we introduce the germinal forms to express the rationalizability
property.
First we choose subsets of propositional variables {pi(t1; t2) : (t1, t2) ∈ S1 × S2} for i = 1, 2
from {p0,p1, ...}, where pi(ti; tj)’s are all distinct. We define two sets of sequences {〈ratνi (si) :
ν ≥ 0〉 : si ∈ Si}, i = 1, 2, interactively as follows: for i = 1, 2,
rat0i (si) = ∨tj∈Sjpi(si; tj); (18)
ratνi (si) = ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(ratν−1j (tj)) ∧ pi(si; tj)〉 for ν ≥ 1.
Recall ∨Φ = ¬∧{¬A : A ∈ Φ} for a finite nonempty set Φ in Lα. Let GR = {〈ratνi (si) : ν ≥ 0〉 :
si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2}. Hence, GR consists of |S1| + |S2| germinal forms, and each 〈ratνi (si) : ν ≥ 0〉
contains 2×|S1 × S2| propositional variables for substitution. set of these germinal forms by GR.
We adopt the set of germinal forms GIR+R := GIR ∪ GR. The series of languages {Lα : α ≥ 0}
is defined based on GIR+R.
Let si ∈ Si and i = 1, 2. For each ν ≥ 0, let Ratνi (si) be the formula obtained from ratνi (si)
by substituting Bsti(ti; tj) for all occurrences of each pi(ti; tj) in ratνi (si), which is still in L0.
The rationalizability formula is given as Rati(si) := ∧〈Ratνi (si) : ν ≥ 0〉, which is in L1. Again,
we note that Rati(si) occurs in the scope of Bi(·).
The formula Rati(si) is intended to be a solution of the inference process (17), i.e., Iri[DR].
However, the directions of predictions are opposite to (17); in (17), predictions go to deeper
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layers along ν = 0, 1, ..., but Ratνi (si) = ∨tj∈Sj (Bj(Ratν−1j (tj)) ∧Bsti(si; tj)) has a prediction
Bj(Rat
ν−1
j (tj)), and Rat
ν−1
j (tj) has a prediction Bi(Rat
ν−1
i (ti)), and so on to ν = 0. In the
latter, we require si to satisfy this backward argument for all ν ≥ 0. For this reason, it holds
that Iri[DR] = Iri[DR1 , D
R
2 ] with some additional axiom determines Ii(si) to be equivalent to
Rati(si). The one direction is given by the following theorem, which will be proved later in this
section.
Theorem 5.1. (Necessity) Let si ∈ Si, sj ∈ Sj and {i, j} = {1, 2}. Then,
(1): ` Iri[DR] ⊃ [Bi(Ii(si)) ⊃ Bi(Rati(si))] in GL(L1);
(2): ` Iri[DR] ⊃ Iri[Ii(si) ⊃ Rati(si);Ij(sj) ⊃ Ratj(sj)] in GL(L2).
In (1), Iri[DR] implies that if agent i believes that si is a final decision, then he believes the
rationalizability property for si. In (2), the conclusions for both agents in (1) form an infinite
regress. The epistemic logic GL(L1) is sufficient for (1), but GL(L2) is required for (2) since the
infinitary formulae {Rati(si)}si∈Si , i = 1, 2 occur in the germinal form Iri[·; ·] of infinite regress.
Consider the converse of the conclusions of Theorem 5.1. If we plug {Rati(si)}si∈Si , i = 1, 2
to {Ii(si)}si∈Si , i = 1, 2 in Iri[DR], they could be regarded as a solution for DR. Formally,
we substitute each Rati(si) for the corresponding Ii(si) in DR for i = 1, 2, and we denote
the resulting formulae by DR(Rat) = [DR1 (Rat), D
R
2 (Rat)]. If D
R
i (Rat) is provable, then each
Rati(si) would be a candidate for Ii(si). This argument is formulated as follows:
V Ri : D
R
i (Rat) ⊃ ∧ti∈Si(Rati(ti) ⊃ Ii(ti)).
We write VR = (V R1 , V
R
2 ).
9 In fact, we need the infinite regress Iri[VR] of VR = (V R1 , V
R
2 ) in
order to have the converse of the conclusions of Theorem 5.1. We have the following theorem,
which will be proved below.
Theorem 5.2. (Full Characterization) Let (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 and i = 1, 2. Then, both hold
in GL(L2) :
(1): ` Iri[VR] ⊃ Iri[Rat1(s1) ⊃ I1(s1),Rat2(s2) ⊃ I2(s2)];
(2): ` Iri[DR] ∧ Iri[VR] ⊃ Iri[Rat1(s1) ≡ I1(s1),Rat2(s2) ≡ I2(s2)].
The first is the converse of Theorem 5.1.(2). Combining this and Theorem 5.1.(2), we obtain
the second assertion, the full characterization of I1(s1) and I2(s2), which is done in GL(Lα) with
α = 2. The infinitary logic GL(L2) is required and is sufficient to have these results.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 study the logical inferences required for decision making and possible
final decisions. These are not about an actual play of a recommended action. The next stage for
agent i is the play of such an action. For this, the agent needs the detailed information about
the payoff functions g1 and g2 of the game G = ({1, 2}, S1, S2, g1, g2). The payoff function gi
(i = 1, 2) is formulated in terms of atomic propositions as follows:
{Pri(s1, s2 : t1, t2) : gi(s1, s2) ≥ gi(t1, t2)} ∪ {¬Pri(s1, s2 : t1, t2) : gi(s1, s2) < gi(t1, t2)}, (19)
which is denoted by Γi. We assume the infinite regress of these preferences, i.e., Iri[Γ] =
Iri[∧Γ1,∧Γ2].
9In the infinitary logic, we can formulate the choice of weakest formulae enjoying the propertyDR as infinitary
formulae without using inference rules
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We denote the set of rationalizable actions by Ri in the sense of the non-formalized game
theory. Incidentally, Bernheim [5] proved that Ri 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2 in any finite game G.
Returning to our logical framework, it holds that
GL(L1) ` Iri[Γ] ⊃ [ ∧
si∈Ri
Bi(Rati(si))] ∧ [ ∧
si∈Si−Ri
Bi(¬Rati(si))], (20)
which will be proved in the end of this section. Thus, under the infinite regress of preferences
Iri[Γ], agent i can decide whether a given action si is rationalizable or not. To relate this
to a description of agent i’s decision, we combine (20) with Theorem 5.2.(2), and we have the
following theorem; under the infinite regresses Iri[DR]∧Iri[VR]∧Iri[Γ], agent i can tell whether
a given si is a decision for him or not. Mathematically, Theorem 5.3 is a corollary of Theorem
5.2.(2) and (20).
Theorem 5.3. (Playability) Let si ∈ Si and i = 1, 2. We have, in GL(L2),
` Iri[DR] ∧ Iri[VR] ∧ Iri[Γ] ⊃ [ ∧
si∈Ri
Bi(Ii(si))] ∧ [ ∧
si∈Si−Ri
Bi(¬Ii(si))].
Note that the conclusions of (20) and Theorem 5.3 can be formulated in the form of infinite
regress including predictions.
The above discourse starts with the decision/prediction criterion and goes to the considera-
tion of a play of the game. The main engine is logical inferences by agent i and the imaginary
agents in his mind. The discourse of decision making is done within the infinitary logic GL(L2).
In the game theory literature, decision making and existence of a resulting outcome have been
discussed a lot, but these are not explicitly connected by agents’ logical inferences. The above
discourse is the very first attempt in this respect.
From the viewpoint of logic, the above discourse is based upon complex germinal forms, GIR
and GR, though they are still obtained by iterations of substitution. The germinal forms GIR
for infinite epistemic regress are conceptually not specific to the theory of rationalizability, but
the germinal forms GRi are specific to the theory of rationalizability. In fact, infinite epistemic
regress can be captured in terms of a fixed-point logic, similar to the common knowledge logic.
However, so far, we do not know whether the rationalizability property is captured in terms of
a fixed-point logic, though we conjecture an affirmative answer.
We remark that when “some prediction” in DRi is replaced by “all predictions”, the theory
becomes the decision making following the line of Nash’s [26] theory; specifically, DRi is changed
into ∧si∈Si(Ii(si) ⊃ ∧tj∈Sj [Bj(Ij(tj)) ⊃ Bsti(si; tj)]〉. Then, we can develop the theory in a
parallel manner, with the use of only germinal forms of infinite regress, to the discourse in this
section, but this theory depends more upon the payoff structure and is more complex as a whole
(see Hu-Kaneko [14] within the framework of a fixed-point logic).
Finally, we prove the above theorems and (20). All steps, except for Lemma 5.4, are done in
proof-theoretic ways in GL(L1) and GL(L2). Lemma 5.4 is proved using the Kripke semantics.
The proof of (20) is partially semantic since Lemma 3.6 is used.
Lemma 5.1 states various properties of infinitary regress formulae Iri[A]. GL(L2) is required
for (3), but GL(L1) is enough for the others as long as content formulae are in L1. We define
the epistemic content of Iroi [A] by Ir
o
i [A] := Ai ∧ Irj [A].
Lemma 5.1. (1): ` Iri[A] ≡ Bi(Iroi [A]);
23
(2): if ` Ak for k = 1, 2, then ` Iri[A];
(3): ` Iri[A] ⊃ Iri[Iroi [A]; Iroj [A]];
(4): ` Iri[A1 ⊃ C1, A2 ⊃ C2] ∧ Iri[A1, A2] ⊃ Iri[C1, C2];
(5): ` Iri[A1, A2] ∧ Iri[C1, C2] ≡ Iri[A1 ∧ C1, A2 ∧ C2].
Proof. We prove (1), (3), and (4).
(1): Recall Iri[A] = ∧〈Irνi [A] : ν ≥ 0〉, where Ir0i [A] = Bi(Ai) and Irν+1i [A] = Bi(Ai ∧ Irνj [A])
for all ν ≥ 0. Hence, ` Iri[A] ⊃ Bi(Ai∧Irνj [A]) for all ν ≥ 0; so ` Iri[A] ⊃ ∧〈Bi(Irνj [A]) : ν ≥ 0〉.
By ∧-Barcan, we have ` Iri[A] ⊃ Bi(∧〈Irνj [A] : ν ≥ 0〉). Thus, ` Iri[A] ⊃ Bi(Ai ∧ Irj [A]). The
converse is similar.
(3): By (1), ` Iri[A] ⊃ Bi(Iroi [A]) for i = 1, 2. Suppose that ` Iri[A] ⊃ Irνi [Iro1[A], Iro2[A]] for
i = 1, 2. Since ` Bi(Irj [A]) ⊃ Bi(Irνj [Iro1[A], Iro2[A]]) by Nec and K, and since ` Iri[A] ⊃
Bi(Ai ∧ Irj [A]) by (1), we have ` Iri[A] ⊃ Irν+1i [Iro1[A], Iro2[A]]. By ∧-rule, ` Iri[A] ⊃
Iri[Ir
o
1[A], Ir
o
2[A]].
(4): It suffices to show that ` Iri[A1 ⊃ C1, A2 ⊃ C2] ∧ Iri(A1, A2) ⊃ Iri[C1, C2]. It is proved
by induction over ν that ` Iri[A1 ⊃ C1, A2 ⊃ C2] ∧ Iri[A1, A2] ⊃ Irνi [C1, C2] for all ν ≥ 0. By
∧-rule, we have the result.
Lemma 5.2. GL(L1) ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ [Ii(si) ⊃ Ratνi (si)] for all ν ≥ 0, si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2.
Proof. We show this by induction on ν. Since ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ DRi and ` DRi ⊃ [Ii(si) ⊃
∨tj∈SjBsti(si; tj)], we have the assertion for ν = 0. Suppose the assertion for ν. Then, `
Irj [D
R] ⊃ [Bj(Ij(sj)) ∧ Bsti(si; sj) ⊃ Bj(Ratνj (sj))∧ Bsti(si; sj)]. Hence, we have ` Irj [DR] ⊃
[∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ij(tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉 ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧ Bsti(si; tj)〉]. Since ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ Irj [DR],
we have ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ [∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ij(tj)) ∧Bsti(si; tj)〉 ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧ Bsti(si; tj)〉].
Also, since ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ [Ii(si) ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ij(tj))∧ Bsti(si; tj)〉], we have ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ [Ii(si) ⊃
∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj)) ∧Bsti(si; tj)〉]. Thus, ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ [Ii(si) ⊃ Ratν+1i (si)]. Hence, we have the
assertion for ν + 1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1.(1): This is obtained by Lemma 5.2.
(2): Lemma 5.2 implies ` Iroi [DR] ⊃ (Ii(si) ⊃ Rati(si)) for i = 1, 2. By Lemma 5.1.(2), we
have ` Iri[Iro1[DR] ⊃ (I1(s1) ⊃ Rat1(s1)), Iro2[DR] ⊃ (I2(s2) ⊃Rat2(s1))]. Using Lemma 5.1.(4),
we have ` Iri[Iro1[DR], Iro2[DR]] ⊃ Iri[I1(s1) ⊃Rat1(s1),I2(s2) ⊃Rat2(s1)]. Since ` Iri[DR] ⊃
Iri[Ir
o
1[D
R], Iro2[D
R]] by Lemma 5.1.(3), we have the assertion.
To prove Theorem 5.2, we will show that ` DRi (Rat) for i = 1, 2. Then, we have `
Iri[D
R
1 (Rat), D
R
2 (Rat)] by Lemma 5.1.(2). By Lemma 5.1.(4), we have ` Iri[VR] ⊃ Iri[Rat1(s1) ⊃
I1(s1), Rat1(s1) ⊃I2(s1)]. This is Theorem 5.2.(1). Combining this with Theorem 5.1.(2) by
Lemma 5.1.(5), we have Theorem 5.2.(2).
The first step for ` DRi (Rat) for i = 1, 2 is the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. (Monotonicity): GL(L0) ` Ratν+1i (si) ⊃ Ratνi (si) for all ν ≥ 0, si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2.
Proof. We prove the assertion by induction over ν ≥ 0. Recall Rat0i (si) = ∨tj∈SjBsti(si; tj).
Since Rat1i (si) = ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Rat0j (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉, we have ` Rat1i (si) ⊃ ∨tj∈SjBest(si; tj), i.e.,
` Rat1i (si) ⊃ Rat0i (si). Suppose that ` Ratν+1i (si) ⊃ Ratνi (si) for i = 1, 2. This implies `
24
Bj(Rat
ν+1
j (sj))∧Bsti(si; sj) ⊃ Bj(Ratνj (sj))∧ Bsti(si; sj), and then ` ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratν+1j (tj))∧
Bsti(si; tj)〉 ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉, i.e., ` Ratν+2i (si) ⊃ Ratν+1i (si).
Now, we prove ` DRi (Rat) for i = 1, 2. The proof of part (1) is based on the soundness/com-
pleteness (Theorem 3.1); the finiteness of Si and Lemma 5.3 are used. In the following lemma,
we use the abbreviation ∧νAν of ∧〈Aν : ν ≥ 0〉.
Lemma 5.4. GL(L1) ` Rati(si) ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj [Bj(Ratj(tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)].
Proof. First, we recall ∧νRatνi (si) = ∧ν∨tj∈Sj [Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)].We prove ` ∧νRatνi (si) ⊃
∨tj∈Sj [∧ν〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))〉∧Bst(si; tj)]. By rule Iα2.(ii) with α = 1, ∧ν〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))〉 is a permis-
sible conjunction. Since ` ∧ν〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))〉 ≡ Bj(∧νRatνj (tj)), it follows that ` ∧νRatνi (si) ⊃
∨tj∈Sj [Bj(∧νRatνj (tj))∧Bst(si; tj)], which is the assertion of the lemma.
LetM = (F , τ) be a serial Kripke model, and w any possible world inW. Suppose (M, w) |=
∧ν ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉. Then, (M, w) |= ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉 for any
ν ≥ 0. Let
T νj = {tj ∈ Sj : (M, w) |= Bj(Ratνj (tj)) ∧ Bsti(si; tj)} for ν ≥ 0.
Since (M, w) |= ∨tj∈Sj 〈Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj)〉, we have T νj 6= ∅ for all ν. Since (M, w) |=
Ratν+1j (sj) ⊃ Ratνj (sj) by Lemma 5.3 and Soundness, we have T νj ⊇ T ν+1j for all ν ≥ 0.
Since Sj is a finite set, there is some ν0 such that T νj is constant for all ν ≥ ν0. Hence, we
find an sj ∈ ∩νT νj , which implies (M, w) |= 〈∧νBj(Ratνj (sj))〉∧Bsti(si; sj). Thus, (M, w) |=
∨tj∈Sj [〈∧νBj(Ratνj (tj))〉 ∧Bsti(si; tj)]. Thus, (M, w) |= ∧νRatνi (si) ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj [〈∧νBj(Ratνj (tj))〉
∧Bsti(si; tj)]. Since F , τ, w ∈W are all arbitrary, we have ` ∧νRatνi (si) ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj [〈∧νBj(Ratνj (tj))〉
∧Bsti(si; tj)] by completeness.
Proof of (20): We use Lemma 3.6, which allows us to infer (20) from assertions about Ratνj (sj)
for finite ν’s. Now, we work with GL(L0). In fact, the main argument uses the technique that
eliminates the belief operators B1(·) and B2(·) from KDn and hence we can work with finitary
classical logic, whose provability relation is denoted by `0 . Correspondingly, we denote, by
Natνj (sj), the formula obtained from Rat
ν
j (sj) eliminating all B1(·) and B2(·). The set ∧(Γ1∪Γ2)
is complete by (19) with respect to atomic preference propositions; for a finitary nonepistemic
formula A containing only atomic preference propositions,
`0 ∧ (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ A or `0 ∧ (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ ¬A. (21)
This is applied to Natνj (sj) for all i = 1, 2, si ∈ Si, and ν ≥ 0. Also, when A contains only atomic
preference propositions for agent i, the premise in (21) can be ∧Γi.
We prove, by induction over ν, that for i = 1, 2, si ∈ Si, and ν ≥ 0,
if `0 ∧ (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ Natνi (si), then ` Iri[Γ] ⊃ Bi(Ratνi (si)); (22)
if `0 ∧ (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ ¬Natνi (si), then ` Iri[Γ] ⊃ Bi(¬Ratνi (si)). (23)
For ν = 0, Nat0i (si) = Rat
0
i (si) = ∨tj∈Sj Bsti(si; tj). Since Iroi [Γ] = (∧Γi) ∧ Irj [Γ], we obtain
(22) and (23) for ν = 0 by applying Nec and K. Suppose that (22) and (23) hold for ν. By (21),
`0 ∧(Γ1∪Γ2) ⊃Natν+1i (si) or `0 ∧(Γ1∪Γ2) ⊃ ¬Natν+1i (si). First, let `0 ∧(Γ1∪Γ2) ⊃ Natν+1i (si);
by definition, Natν+1i (si) = ∨tj∈Sj (Natνj (tj)∧Bsti(si; tj)), and hence, by (21) again, `0 ∧(Γ1 ∪
Γ2) ⊃ (Natνj (tj)∧Bsti(si; tj)) for some tj ∈ Sj . For this tj , it holds that ` ∧Γi ⊃Bsti(si; tj)
and ` Irj [Γ] ⊃ Bj(Ratνj (tj)) by (22) for ν. Combining these, we have ` Irj [Γ] ∧ (∧Γi) ⊃
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Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧Bsti(si; tj). Hence, ` Irj [Γ] ∧ (∧Γi) ⊃ ∨tj∈Sj [Bj(Ratνj (ti))∧Bsti(si; tj)]. Thus,
` Iroi [Γ] ⊃Ratν+1i (si), so, ` Iri[Γ] ⊃ Bi(Ratν+1i (si)) by Nec and K.
Second, let `0 ∧(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ ¬Natν+1i (si). Again, by definition and (21), `0 ∧(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃
¬(Natνj (tj)∧Bsti(si; tj)) for all tj ∈ Sj . Let tj ∈ Sj . Then, `0 ∧(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ ¬Natνj (tj) or
`0 ∧(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ ¬Bsti(si; tj). Then, by (23) for ν, we have ` Irj [Γ] ⊃ Bj(¬Ratνj (ti)) or `
∧Γi ⊃ ¬Bsti(si; tj). Combining these, we have ` Irj [Γ]∧(∧Γi) ⊃ Bj(¬Ratνj (ti))∨(¬Bsti(si; tj)).
This and Axiom D for Bj(·) imply ` Irj [Γ] ∧ (∧Γi) ⊃ ¬Bj(Ratνj (ti)) ∨(¬Bsti(si; tj)), i.e.,
` Irj [Γ]∧(∧Γi) ⊃ ¬(Bj(Ratνj (tj))∧ Bsti(si; tj)). Since tj is arbitrary, we have ` Irj [Γ]∧(∧Γi) ⊃
¬ ∨tj∈Sj (Bj(Ratνj (ti)) ∧Bsti(si; tj)). That is, ` Iroi [Γ] ⊃ ¬Ratν+1i (si), which, by Nec and K,
implies (23) for ν + 1.
Now, take any si ∈ Si. Then, let si be rationalizable action. Then, `0 ∧(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃Natνi (si)
for all ν ≥ 0. In this case, by (22), ` Iroi [Γ] ⊃Ratνi (si) for all ν ≥ 0. Thus, ` Iroi [Γ] ⊃Rati(si) by
∧-rule. Hence, ` Iri[Γ] ⊃ Bi(Rati(si)).
Let si be a non-rationalizable action. Then, `0 ∧(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊃ ¬Natνi (si) for some ν ≥ 0. In
this case, by (23), ` Iroi [Γ] ⊃ ¬Ratνi (sj) for some ν ≥ 0. By Lemma 3.6, we have ` Iroi [Γ] ⊃
¬〈Ratνj (sj) : ν ≥ 0〉. Hence, ` Iri[Γ] ⊃ Bi(¬Ratj(sj)). These imply (20).
6 Proof of the Completeness of GL(Lα) by Q-filters
We adopt the Q-filter method to prove completeness of GL(Lα). First, we give a sketch of the
proof, a summary of the concepts to be used, and then go to the main body of the proof.
6.1 Sketch of the proof
As usual, we show that if a formula A ∈ Lα is not provable, we find a Kripke model so that A is
not true in some world. It is standard in the literature to construct maximal consistent sets as
those possible worlds via the Henkin method (cf. Hughes and Cresswell [15]). This may appear
to be applicable to our logics because the set of formulae Lα (0 ≤ α ≤ ω) is kept countable.
But this does not work in our case for two reasons. Since GL(Lα) allows infinite conjunctions,
the Henkin method to extend a consistent set does not fit our purpose; the infinitary approach
from Karp [19] avoids this difficulty by requiring Axiom of Choice in the axiomatic system
(cf. Heifeitz [12] in the epistemic logic context). Instead, we adopt the Q-filter method, due
to Rasiowa-Sikorski [29] for algebraic semantics and Tanaka-Ono [33] for Kripke semantics. A
Q-filter is a strengthened version of a prime filter to deal with infinitary conjunctions. This
method has been developed as an alternative to prove completeness for a first-order logic as well
as for infinitary modal logics (cf., Tanaka [32]). We note that the countability of the language
Lα is crucial in applications of these lemmas.
The Q-filter method relies upon various concepts in Boolean algebra, though we deal with
Kripke semantics rather than algebraic semantics. Utilizing the Q-filter method, we construct a
counter-model. This is not the canonical model; instead, we start with the Lindenbaum algebra
Lα/ ≡, where ≡ is the equivalence relation of provability in GL(Lα). Then, a Q-filter is a
subset of Lα/ ≡ and is a possible world for the counter-model. A Q-filter is required to satisfy
certain closure properties in addition to the prime filter condition. These closure properties are
guaranteed by the formula construction steps, Iα2.(i) and (ii), for the definition of Lα. Once the
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set of possible worlds is defined, accessibility relations Ri, i ∈ N are defined in a similar manner
as in the standard proof based on maximal consistent sets.
In Section 6.2, we provide a small summary of Q-filters in a Boolean algebra. In Section
6.3, we define the Lindenbaum algebra based on GL(Lα), and prepare for applications of the
Rasiowa-Sikorski and Tanaka-Ono lemmas. In Section 6.4, we construct a counter-model. A
key step is the truth lemma that a formula A is true in a world w if and only if [[A]] ∈ w, where
[[A]] is the equivalence class including A. This step requires the Tanaka-Ono Lemma to deal
with Bi(·). Finally, we show that if 0 A, there is a Q-filter w such that [[A]] /∈ w; the existence
of such a Q-filter w is guaranteed by the Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma.
6.2 Boolean algebra and Q-filters
We give basic definitions and relevant properties of a Boolean algebra (cf., Halmos [10] and
Mendelson [23]). Consider a Boolean algebra B = (B,u,unionsq,−,0,1).We define a ≤ b iff aunionsq b = b.
Then ≤ is a lattice ordering on B (i.e., a u b and a unionsq b are the greatest lower bound and least
upper bound of a, b with respect to ≤). We say that a nonempty subset F of B is a filter iff
F1(upward closed): a ≤ b and a ∈ F =⇒ b ∈ F ; and F2(u-closed): a, b ∈ F =⇒ au b ∈ F. Also,
we say that a filter F is prime iff P1(Non-triviality): F 6= B; and P2(unionsq-property): a unionsq b ∈ F
=⇒ a ∈ F or b ∈ F. We have the following fact on a prime filter F :
a ∈ F ⇔ (−a) /∈ F. (24)
In the following, we write a → b for −a unionsq b = (−a) unionsq b. When F is a prime filter, a → b ∈ F if
and only if a /∈ F or b ∈ F, since (−a) unionsq a = 1 ∈ F.
For any subset S of B, the greatest lower bound of S in (B,u,unionsq,−,0,1) is denoted by uS,
and the least upper bound of S is denoted by unionsqS. Note that uS and unionsqS may not exist, but if
either exists, it is unique. Let Q = (Q1,Q2) be a pair of countable sets of nonempty subsets of
B so that
((u,unionsq)-closed): uQ1 and unionsqQ2 exist for all Q1 ∈ Q1 and Q2 ∈ Q2.
We say that a prime filter F is a Q-filter iff
Q1: for any Q1 ∈ Q1, Q1 ⊆ F =⇒ uQ1 ∈ F ;
Q2: for any Q2 ∈ Q2, unionsqQ2 ∈ F =⇒ a ∈ Q2 for some a ∈ F .
These correspond to the conditions F2 and P2. The following is Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma (see
also Tanaka-Ono [33]).
Lemma 6.1. (Rasiowa-Sikorski [29]) Let B be a Boolean algebra, and Q = (Q1,Q2) a pair
of countable sets of nonempty subsets of B with (u,unionsq)-closedness. For any a, b ∈ B, if a  b,
then there is a Q-filter F such that a ∈ F and b /∈ F.
For a given Q = (Q1,Q2), we denote the set of all Q-filters of B by FQ(B). The nonemptiness
of FQ(B) follows from Lemma 6.1 if 0 6= 1. The set FQ(B) will be adopted for the set of all possible
worlds in our construction of a Kripke model.
Since the logic GL(Lα) has belief operators, Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma is not enough: We
extend it, which is Tanaka-Ono lemma. We say that B = (B,u,unionsq, −,0,1,1, ...,n) is a multi-
modal algebra iff
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ma1: (B,u,unionsq,−,0,1) is a Boolean algebra;
ma2: for i ∈ N, i is a unary operator on B satisfying the property that i1 = 1
and i(a u b) = ia uib for all a, b ∈ B.
We define −1i F = {x ∈ B : ix ∈ F} for any F ⊆ B.
Let B be a multi-modal algebra, and Q = (Q1,Q2) a fixed pair of countable sets of nonempty
subsets of B satisfying (u,unionsq)-closedness. The following three conditions are crucial for the
Tanaka-Ono Lemma: for all i ∈ N ,
q0: for all Q1 ∈ Q1, u(iQ1) := u{ia : a ∈ Q1} exists and u(iQ1) = i(uQ1);
q1: {i(a→ b) : b ∈ Q1} ∈ Q1 for all a ∈ B and all Q1 ∈ Q1;
q2: {i(b→ a) : b ∈ Q2} ∈ Q1 for all a ∈ B and all Q2 ∈ Q2.
Lemma 6.2. (Tanaka-Ono [33]) Let B = (B,u,unionsq,−,0,1,1, ...,n) be a multi-modal
algebra, and Q = (Q1,Q2) a fixed pair of countable sets of nonempty subsets of B. Suppose that
Q satisfies (u,unionsq)-closedness, and the conditions q0, q1, and q2 for i ∈ N . Then, for any i ∈ N,
b ∈ B, and F ∈ FQ(B), if ib /∈ F, there exists a G ∈ FQ(B) such that −1i F ⊆ G and b /∈ G.
6.3 Lindenbaum algebra
Recall that for any A,B ∈ Lα, A ≡ B iff ` (A ⊃ B)∧ (B ⊃ A) in GL(Lα).We take the quotient
set Lα/ ≡. For any A ∈ Lα, we denote, by [[A]], the equivalence class in Lα/ ≡ including A. In
B := Lα/ ≡, we define elements 0,1 and operations u,unionsq,−, and 1, ...,n by
`1: 0 =[[¬p0 ∧ p0]] and 1 =[[p0 ⊃ p0]];
`2: for any A,B ∈ Lα, [[A]] u [[B]] = [[A ∧B]], [[A]] unionsq [[B]] = [[¬(¬A ∧ ¬B)]], −[[A]] = [[¬A]];
`3: for any A ∈ Lα, i[[A]] = [[Bi(A)]] for i ∈ N.
Using these, we have, for any A,B ∈ Lα,
[[A]]→ [[B]] = (−[[A]]) unionsq [[B]] = [[¬A]] unionsq [[B]] = [[¬(¬¬A ∧ ¬B)]] = [[A ⊃ B]]. (25)
It follows from this that i([[A]]→ [[B]]) = i([[A ⊃ B]]) = [[Bi(A ⊃ B)]].
Lemma 6.3. L = (B,0,1,u,unionsq,−,1, ...,n) with B = (Lα/ ≡) is a multi-modal algebra.
Proof. We can show in the standard manner that (B,0,1,u,unionsq,−) with B = (Lα/ ≡) is a
Boolean algebra. It remains to show condition ma2. Let i ∈ N. Since ` [(A ⊃ A) ⊃ Bi(A ⊃
A)]∧ [Bi(A ⊃ A) ⊃ (A ⊃ A)], we have i1 = 1. Since ` [Bi(A∧C) ⊃ Bi(A)∧Bi(C)]∧ [Bi(A)∧
Bi(C) ⊃ Bi(A ∧ C)], we have i([[A]] u [[C]]) = i[[A]] ui[[C]].
In the following, we call L in Lemma 6.3 the Lindenbaum algebra. We prove the following
lemma, which guarantees we can use Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 in the proof of completeness.
Lemma 6.4. For any ∧Φ ∈ Lα and i ∈ N,
(a): u{[[C]] : C ∈ Φ} = [[∧Φ]];
(b): u{i[[C]] : C ∈ Φ} = [[Bi(∧Φ)]].
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Proof. (a): First, let us see that [[∧Φ]] is a lower bound of {[[C]] : C ∈ Φ}. Since ` ∧Φ ⊃ C for
all C ∈ Φ by L4, we have (−[[∧Φ]]) unionsq [[C]] = 1. Let C ∈ Φ. Then, we have
[[∧Φ]] = [[∧Φ]] u 1 = [[∧Φ]] u 〈(−[[∧Φ]]) unionsq [[C]]〉
= 〈[[∧Φ]] u (−[[∧Φ]])〉 unionsq 〈[[∧Φ]] u [[C]]〉 = 0 unionsq 〈[[∧Φ]] u [[C]]〉 = [[∧Φ]] u [[C]].
Hence, [[∧Φ]] ≤ [[C]]. Since C is arbitrary in Φ, [[∧Φ]] is a lower bound of {[[C]] : C ∈ Φ}.
It remains to show that [[∧Φ]] is the greatest lower bound of {[[C]] : C ∈ Φ}. Now, let [[D]] be
a lower bound of {[[C]] : C ∈ Φ}. This means [[D]] ≤ [[C]], i.e., [[D]] unionsq [[C]] = [[C]], for any C ∈ Φ.
Let C ∈ Φ. Then (−[[D]]) unionsq [[C]] = (−[[D]]) unionsq ([[D]] unionsq [[C]]) = (−[[D]] unionsq [[D]]) unionsq [[C]] = 1 unionsq [[C]] = 1.
This implies ` D ⊃ C. Since C is arbitrary in Φ, we have, by ∧-rule, we have ` D ⊃ ∧Φ. This
means that [[∧Φ]] is greater than or equal to [[D]] in L. Thus, [[∧Φ]] is the greatest lower bound
of {[[C]] : C ∈ Φ}.
(b): Since ` Bi(∧Φ) ⊃ Bi(A) for all A ∈ Φ, and since {i[[A]] : A ∈ Φ} = {[[Bi(A)]] : A ∈ Φ},
[[Bi(∧Φ)]] is a lower bound of {i[[A]] : A ∈ Φ}. Now, let [[D]] be a lower bound of {i[[A]] :
A ∈ Φ}. Using the same argument as in (a), we have ` D ⊃ Bi(A) for all A ∈ Φ. Thus, ` D ⊃
∧Bi(Φ) by ∧-rule. By ∧-Barcan, we have ` D ⊃ Bi(∧Φ). This means that [[Bi(∧Φ)]] is the
greatest lower bound of {i[[A]] : A ∈ Φ}.
Now we define a pair Q = (Q1,Q2) as follows:
Q1 = {{[[A]] : A ∈ Φ} : ∧Φ ∈ Lα} and Q2 = ∅. (26)
Then, Q1 is a countable. Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 6.5. (1): Q = (Q1,Q2) satisfies (u,unionsq)-closedness.
(2): Q = (Q1,Q2) satisfies the conditions q0, q1, q2.
Proof. Since Q2 = ∅, the (u,unionsq)-closedness for unionsq and q2 are vacuous.
(1): Let Q ∈ Q1. This Q is written as {[[A]] : A ∈ Φ} for some ∧Φ ∈ Lα. Since uQ = [[∧Φ]] by
Lemma 6.4.(a), uQ belongs to B = Lα/ ≡.
(2)(q0): We show that for anyQ ∈ Q1, u(iQ) := u{ia : a ∈ Q} exists and u(iQ) = i(uQ).
Since Q ∈ Q1, {ia : a ∈ Q} is expressed as {[[Bi(A)]] : A ∈ Φ} for some ∧Φ ∈ Lα. By Iβ1-Iβ2,
∧Φ ∈ Lα implies ∧Bi(Φ) ∈ Lα. Then, by Lemma 6.4.(b) and ` ∧Bi(Φ) ≡ Bi(∧Φ), it holds that
u(iQ) = [[∧〈Bi(A) : A ∈ Φ}]] = [[Bi(∧Φ)]] = i[[∧Φ]] = i uQ.
(q1) : Let Q ∈ Q1 and a ∈ B. We show {i(a → b) : b ∈ Q} ∈ Q1. Since a = [[A]] for some
A ∈ Lα and Q is also expressed as {[[B]] : B ∈ Φ} for some ∧Φ ∈ Lα, we have, by (25),
{i(a→ b) : b ∈ Q} = {[[Bi(A ⊃ B)]] : B ∈ Φ}. (27)
Since ∧〈A ⊃ B : B ∈ Φ〉 ∈ Lα by Iα2.(i), we have ∧〈Bi(A ⊃ B) : B ∈ Φ〉 ∈ Lα by Iα2.(ii). Let
Φ′ = 〈Bi(A ⊃ B) : B ∈ Φ〉. Then, since ∧Φ′ ∈ Lα, we have, by (27), {i(a → b) : b ∈ Q} =
{[[Bi(A ⊃ B)]] : B ∈ Φ} ∈ Q1.
6.4 Construction of a counter-model
Recall that L = (B,0,1,u,unionsq,−,1, ...,n) with B = Lα/ ≡ is the Lindenbaum algebra given
in Lemma 6.3. Also, let Q = (Q1,Q2) be given by (26). Now, we define a Kripke frame
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K = (W ;R1, ..., Rn) and an assignment τ as follows:
(i): W = FQ(L), where FQ(L) is the set of all Q-filters for L;
(ii): for all i ∈ N, wRiu if and only if −1i w ⊆ u;
(iii): for any w ∈W and any propositional variable p, τ(w, p) = > if and only if [[p]] ∈ w.
The nonemptiness of FQ(L) follows from Lemma 6.1 and the contradiction-freeness of GL(Lα)
noted after Theorem 3.1. Then, M = (K, τ) = (W ;R1, ..., Rn, τ) is a Kripke model.
Lemma 6.6. Ri is serial for each i ∈ N.
Proof. Let w ∈W. Consider i0 = i[[¬p0∧p0]] Then, i0 = [[Bi(¬p0∧p0)]] = [[¬p0∧p0]] = 0
by `1 and by Axiom D. Since w is a prime filter, we have i0 = 0 /∈w. By Lemma 6.2 (Tanaka-
Ono Lemma), we have u ∈ FQ(L) such that −1i w ⊆ u, i.e., wRiu, and 0 /∈u.
The following lemma is central to the completeness theorem.
Lemma 6.7. (Truth lemma) For any A ∈ Lα and w ∈W, (K, τ, w) |= A if and only if [[A]] ∈ w.
Proof. We prove the assertion by induction along the definition Iβ0-Iβ2 (β ≤ α) of formulae.
Consider a propositional variable p. Then (K, τ, w) |= p ⇔ τ(w, p) = > ⇔ [[p]] ∈ w.
Now, consider a non-propositional formula A in Lβ. Suppose that A is generated by Iβ1.
Here, the induction hypothesis (abbreviated as IH), is simply that the assertion holds for any
proper subformulae of A. The case ∧ is applied to an infinitary conjunctive formula.
(⊃) : Let (K, τ, w) |= A ⊃ B. Then (K, τ, w) 2 A or (K, τ, w)  B. By the induction hypothesis,
we have [[A]] /∈ w or [[B]] ∈ w. Since [[¬A]] ∈ w or [[B]] ∈ w, and since [[¬A]] ≤ [[A ⊃ B]] and
[[B]] ≤ [[A ⊃ B]], we have [[A ⊃ B]] ∈ w.
Let [[A ⊃ B]] ∈ w. Then [[¬A ∨ B]] = [[¬A]] unionsq [[B]] ∈ w. Since w is a prime filter, we have
[[¬A]] ∈ w or [[B]] ∈ w. Hence [[A]] /∈ w or [[B]] ∈ w. By IH, we have (K, τ, w) 2 A or (K, τ, w)  B.
Thus, (K, τ, w)  A ⊃ B.
(¬) : The proof is similar.
(Bi) : Let (K, τ, w) |= Bi(A). Then (K, τ, u) |= A for any u with (w, u) ∈ Ri. By IH, [[A]] ∈ u
for any u with (w, u) ∈ Ri. Now, on the contrary, suppose that i[[A]] /∈ w. Then, by Lemma
6.2 (Tanaka-Ono Lemma), there is a u ∈ FQ(L) such that −1i w ⊆ u and [[A]] /∈ u. This is a
contradiction. Hence, [[Bi(A)]] = i[[A]] ∈ w.
Let [[Bi(A)]] = i[[A]] ∈ w. Then [[A]] ∈ u for all u with −1i w ⊆ u. By IH, we have
(K, τ, u) |= A for all u with (w, u) ∈ Ri. Hence, (K, τ, u) |= Bi(A).
(∧) : Let ∧Φ be a finite conjunctive formula generated by Iβ1, or an infinite conjunctive
formula given from a germinal form. In the latter case, any A ∈ Φ belongs to ∪γ<βLγ . In either
case, IH is that the assertion holds for any A ∈ Φ. In these cases, we have the following proof.
Let (K, τ, w) |= ∧Φ. Then (K, τ, w) |= A for all A ∈ Φ. By IH, [[A]] ∈ w for all A ∈ Φ. Then
u{[[A]] : A ∈ Φ} exists by Lemma 6.5.(1), and it belongs to w by Q1. Hence, [[∧Φ]] = u{[[A]] :
A ∈ Φ} ∈ w.
Let [[∧Φ]] ∈ w. Then [[∧Φ]] ≤ [[A]] for all A ∈ Φ. Since w is a filter, we have [[A]] ∈ w for all
A ∈ Φ by F1. Hence (K, τ, w) |= A for all A ∈ Φ by IH, which implies (K, τ, w) |= ∧Φ.
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Now, consider the cases of Iβ2.(i), Iβ2.(ii), and Iβ2.(iii). Suppose that ∧Φ = ∧〈D ⊃ Cν :
ν ≥ 0〉, ∧Φ = ∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉, or ∧Φ = ∧〈Cν ∧Dν : ν ≥ 0〉 be generated by Iβ2.(i), Iβ2.(ii),
or Iβ2.(iii) from D, ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉, and ∧〈Dν : ν ≥ 0〉. Here, IH is that the assertion holds form
D, ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉, and ∧〈Dν : ν ≥ 0〉.
Let (K, τ, w) |= ∧〈D ⊃ Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. Then (K, τ, w) |= D ⊃ Cν , i.e., (K, τ, w) 2 D or
(K, τ, w) |= Cν , for all ν ≥ 0. The latter part implies (K, τ, w) |= ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. By IH, we have
[[D]] /∈ w or [[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w. Since w is a prime filter, we have [[D]]→ [[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w,
which implies [[D ⊃ ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w by (25). Since ` (D ⊃ ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉) ≡ ∧〈D ⊃ Cν :
ν ≥ 0〉, we have [[∧〈D ⊃ Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w. The converse can be obtained by tracing back this
argument.
Let (K, τ, w) |= ∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉. This implies (K, τ, w) |= Bi(∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉). Let u be any
world with (w, u) ∈ Ri. Then, (K, τ, u) |= ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. By IH, we have [[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ u.
Now, on the contrary, suppose that i[[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] /∈ w. Then, by Lemma 6.2 (Tanaka-
Ono Lemma), there is a uo ∈ FQ(L) such that −1i w ⊆ uo and [[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] /∈ uo. Since
(w, uo) ∈ Ri by the definition of Ri, this is a contradiction. Hence, i[[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w.
Thus, [[∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉)]] = [[Bi(∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉)]] = i[[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w, using ∧-Barcan.
Conversely, let [[∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉)]] ∈ w. Then, i[[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] = [[Bi(∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉)]] =
[[∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w using ∧-Barcan. Let u ∈ W be an arbitrary world with −1i w ⊆ u.
Then, [[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ u. By IH, we have (K, τ, u) |= ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉. Since u is arbitrary with
(w, u) ∈ Ri, we have (K, τ, u) |= Bi(Cν) for all ν ≥ 0. Hence, (K, τ, u) |= ∧〈Bi(Cν) : ν ≥ 0〉.
Let (K, τ, w) |= ∧〈Cν ∧ Dν : ν ≥ 0〉. Then (K, τ, w) |= Cν ∧ Dν , i.e., (K, τ, w) |= Cν and
(K, τ, w) |= Dν for all ν ≥ 0. This implies (K, τ, w) |= ∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 and (K, τ, w) |= ∧〈Dν : ν ≥
0〉. By IH, [[∧〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w and [[∧〈Dν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w. Since w is a filter, we have [[∧〈Cν
: ν ≥ 0〉]] u[[∧〈Dν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ wν . Since ` [〈Cν : ν ≥ 0〉 ∧ 〈Dν : ν ≥ 0〉] ≡ ∧〈Cν ∧Dν : ν ≥ 0〉, we
have [[∧〈Cν ∧Dν : ν ≥ 0〉]] ∈ w. The converse can be obtained by tracing back this argument.
The final step of completeness is to show that for any A ∈ Lα, if 0 A, then (K, τ, w) 2 A
for some world w ∈ W . Suppose 0 A. This means [[A]] 6= 1; hence, [[A]]  1. Applying Lemma
6.1 (Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma) to [[A]] and 1, there is a Q-filter F such that 1 ∈ F and [[A]] /∈ F.
Denote F by w. Then, by Lemma 6.7, we have (K, τ, w) 2 A.
Remark 6.1. Lemma 6.6 can be extended to other epistemic axioms, T, 4, or 5, and the
corresponding conditions, reflexivity, transitivity, or euclidean for Ri. Transitivity is derived
from Axiom 4: Let −1i w ⊆ u and −1i u ⊆ v and [[A]] ∈ −1i w. Then, [[Bi(A)]] ∈ w. Since
` Bi(A) ⊃ BiBi(A), we have [[Bi(A)]] ≤ [[BiBi(A)]]. Since w is a filter, we have [[BiBi(A)]] ∈ w;
so [[Bi(A)]] ∈ −1i w. Hence, [[Bi(A)]] ∈ u, i.e., [[A]] ∈ −1i u. Repeating this argument, we have
[[A]] ∈ −1i v. Also, euclidean: wRiu and wRiv =⇒ uRiv is derived from Axiom 5. Let −1i w ⊆ u
and −1i w ⊆ v. Suppose that for some A, [[A]] ∈ −1i u but [[A]] /∈ v. Since −1i w ⊆ v, we have
[[Bi(A)]] /∈ w. Thus, [[¬Bi(A)]] ∈ w. By Axiom 5, [[Bi(¬Bi(A))]] ∈ w. Thus, [[¬Bi(A))]] ∈
−1i w ⊆ u, which is a contradiction to [[A]] ∈ −1i u. Hence, −1i u ⊆ v.
7 Conclusions
We developed a series of small infinitary epistemic logics. This series inherits useful features
from both infinitary logic approach and fixed-point logic approach. Similar to the infinitary
logic approach, our framework allows for explicit and unified formulations of infinitary concepts
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such as common knowledge; and it allows for the direct evaluation of depths of such infinitary
concepts. Similar to the fixed-point approach, we can control infinitary expressions by imposing
specific germinal forms. Moreover, we have shown that our completeness result holds for each
layer, and our logics in different layers are connected by the conservative extension relation.
We provided two applications. The first is about explicit definabilities of epistemic axioms
T, 4, and 5. Specifically, we showed that Axiom T can be captured in GL(Lα) for any α
(0 ≤ α ≤ ω), Axiom 4 can be done in GL(Lω), since it needs infinite iterations of the belief
operator. Axiom 5 is not explicitly definable for any α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω). These results differentiate
the three axioms. The second is for game theory: we considered an agent’s decision-making in
a game, based on the idea of rationalizability. We gave a full epistemic characterization, which
was done within GL(L2), a shallow part in the series in (1), and, based on this characterization,
we obtained the playability result for an agent in a game.
Our approach gives rise to new open problems. As already stated, a full study of Table 3.1
is an open problem of great importance. As seen in Section 4.3, we showed that some known
fixed-point logics such as common knowledge logic can be faithfully embedded into our system
(Theorem 4.7). In recent years, the fixed-point approach has been extensively developed in
modal µ-calculus, and a natural question is whether such embedding results can be extended to
(some specific fragments of) those logics, and what relationship exists between our system and
modal µ-calculus. A full answer to this question remains open, though we gave a summary of
differences in our approach and modal µ-calculus in the end of Section 4.3.
There are open problems related to explicit definability and embedding. We studied explicit
definability and embedding for each of the three epistemic axioms and common knowledge.
However, a general criterion for an infinitary (and/or finitary) concept to be explicitly definable
in some GL(Lα) remains open.10 A related problem is to have a general understanding of when
a fixed-point logic can be embedded into our system.
Our framework adopts the Hilbert-style proof theory. One alternative would be to formulate
it in the Gentzen style sequence calculus. In particular, if cut-elimination is available, then one
can discuss the sizes of proofs. For this purpose, there are two possibilities from the literature.
One is to adopt Kaneko-Nagashima [21]’s formulation in the context of an infinitary logic,
which is close to the original Gentzen formulation. Cut-elimination is available, while ∧-Barcan
prevents it from implying the full subformula property. Another is in the modal µ-calculus,
for which Brünnler-Studer [6] provided a different Gentzen style formulation, focusing on some
shallow fragments for cut-elimination. A full study of these systems remains open.
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